Epistemic Attitudes and Theistic Commitment

Belief and Acceptance

My second distinction is between belief-based and acceptance-based commitment. I begin with the difference between belief and acceptance, in the meantime confining my presentation to personal, rather than grouply, contexts. When a person believes something, as when a philosopher believes that there are moral facts, she will have two dispositions. One is a disposition to have a distinctly belief feeling that there are moral facts. A belief feeling is an internal awareness of a sense of conviction. The other disposition is to behave in appropriate ways in relevant circumstances. This would include being inclined to saying that there are moral facts, using that there are moral facts as a premise in her practical reasoning, and acting in light of there being moral facts, when appropriate. Thus, belief is a dispositional complex of both feeling and behavior. And both are something that happens to the person. One finds oneself with one’s beliefs, not choosing or deciding to have them.

I will say that a person accepts something, as when a philosopher might accept that the Ontological Argument is sound, when he has the appropriate behavioral disposition, as before, but does not have a disposition to experience that inner belief-feeling that the argument is sound. For example, he has considered the arguments of philosophers for and against the Ontological Argument and concludes that the considerations in its favor are far stronger than those against. However, the arguments on behalf of the argument are not quite enough to create in him the belief that the argument is sound. He lacks a disposition to have that special inner belief-feeling. So, he decides to accept as his philosophical position that the Ontological Argument is sound. He adopts it, thinks in terms of its being sound, will advance this view, and defend it against critics and argue against deniers. He would be expected to explore further the implications of the existence of a perfect being. He accepts that the Ontological Argument is sound. He accepts, but does not believe, not because he doubts it or disbelieves it, but because he only accepts it. Acceptance, as opposed to belief, is ordinarily voluntary, assuming a position deliberately, or nearly deliberately13.

Another example. You weigh the merits of a candidate for Prime Minister and find that much points to one person being the best candidate. However, you do not quite believe it. But you do have enough to go on to be prepared to accept that she is the best candidate. So, you vote for her, hope she wins, and tell others to vote for her, as well. You have accepted something that you do not quite believe.

Everything else being equal, a commitment to something because of, or in step with, what one accepts can be expected to be less decisive than a commitment on account of what one believes. One simply finds oneself with a belief-feeling, whose power could propel one to a decisive commitment. The commitment will tend toward the decisive. Not necessarily so for commitment because of what one only accepts. Acceptance involves a voluntary embracing of a proposition, typically because of weighing

13From the large literature on the distinction between belief and acceptance, my presentation here follows closely William Alston, “Belief, Acceptance and Theistic Faith,” in Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, editors, Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Lanham and London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). See also XXXXXXXXXXX.

up pros and cons and coming out in favor. When that is the case, one might be expected to keep an eye on possible changes in the balance of evidence or reasons for and against what has been accepted. In addition, one can be expected to stake more of one’s self and what is of importance on a belief than on an acceptance. Also, generally speaking, a belief is not as easily dislodged, as is what one (merely) accepts. So though admittedly not always, we should expect a more intense commitment to belief than to acceptance.

The distinction between belief and acceptance cuts across the difference between personal and grouply attitudes. I propose, and this will be controversial, that a person could have an exclusively grouply belief. A grouply belief would obtain when one has the tendency to have the appropriate, real, belief-feeling about a proposition that the group maintains when thinking of oneself as a member of the group and yet fail to have that tendency in personal contexts. There is no reason to suppose that such tendencies must be all or nothing for all and every context. They could be triggered selectively by the category of a present context.

Theistic commitments can be either belief-based or acceptance-based. A theistic adherent will have an acceptance-based commitment when he has made a conscious decision of acceptance, but when he does not have a belief-feeling at the basis. We should expect that for any given theistic person, commitments to some of the elements of the religion will be belief-based, while others will be merely acceptance-based. Also, we should expect acceptance-based theistic commitment to be less intense than belief-based commitment.

Hence, the demand that theistic adherence be decisive goes better with wanting theistic adherence to be based on appropriate theistic beliefs, rather than on acceptances. Since it is ordinarily impossible to decide to have a belief, including a theistic one, the demand that theistic commitment be decisive, which goes best with a belief- basis, should amount to no more than having a belief-base as an ideal, while being able to recognize acceptance as at least a tolerable interim epistemic attitude.

While one might set up decisive commitment as a goal it should be clear that religious belief is manifest by a variety of epistemic attitudes. These include ones that fall short of being decisive, and the formation of which organized religions enhance on the ground. The social character of a religion and what is often a demand for compliance beyond the belief capacity of a person makes room for and can even encourage, respectively, grouply commitment and acceptance, rather than personal belief.

These are natural effects of organized religions that make demands of adherence.

Religions and Shows of Commitment

On the other hand, religions surely want their devotees to have not only grouply commitments but personal ones as well. And we have seen the demand that followers have decisive rather than tentative commitments. So, religions will see value in promoting the impression that their devotees are committed personally and not just grouply to their religion. And, religions will see value in promoting the impression that commitment reflects belief rather than acceptance. These impressions will enhance greater expectations for decisive adherence.

Religions have mechanisms for creating a pragmatic implication that adherents are committed personally, not just grouply, and as the result of having a full-blown belief. This is well illustrated when establishing, and sometimes also performing ritual recitations of, creedal formulations formulated as individual belief. These fulfill the desire that “you all speak the same thing, and there be no divisions among you; but you be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment. (1 Corinthians 1.10) The “same mind” can be construed as referring to personal commitment, and “same judgment” as referring to shared belief. So, for example, the Apostles Creed begins and continues with “I believe.” (Note that the Nicene Creed, in contrast, repeats that “We believe.”) The Protestant Westminster Confession refers throughout to individual belief. While Judaism has no official creed, the closest to one is the Ani Maamin (“I believe”) statement of thirteen principles of faith, based on Maimonides. It is thirteen statements of personal belief, starting with, “I believe with complete faith that the Creator, blessed be His name, is the Creator and Guide of all the created beings, and that He alone has made, does make, and will make all things”.

Religions are strengthened when their adherents have personal beliefs in the religion, for this enhances decisive commitment. When devotees will likely have other epistemic attitudes as the ground of their theistic commitment it can be useful to create an impression otherwise.

Back to Religious Diversity

We have seen Robert McKim arguing that considering the diversity of religions the devotee of a religion should commit to the religion only in a tentative manner, not decisively. Cognizant of other knowledgeable, intelligent people who disagree with his religious commitment the devotee should be aware of the possibility of his having to change his mind about his religious adherence in accordance with the views of those who disagree with his religion.

Once upon a time, religious devotees overwhelmingly knew little of religions other than their own. And what they did know of them, often those religions and/or their followers were perceived as evil and threatening. Mckim is addressing us religious devotees for whom matters today are very different. We know about religions other than our own and know how to find out much more. Some of us even have studied other religions and their beliefs. A devotee of one religion has contact and friendships with members of other religions and is familiar with them in mass communication and otherwise. We know at least some of these others to be decent, intelligent, thoughtful people and learn of their religious commitments and ways of life. And we know these others to be as decisively committed to their religions as we are. The situation is one of the cultural presence of religions in competition with our own in terms of truth-claims and mandated behavior.

McKim wants us living in such a milieu to adopt his T- Principle that “Disagreement on a matter between people with relevant integrity and competence, provides a reason for a person to adopt only a tentative commitment on that matter.” Hence, we religious devotees he addresses should take care to refrain from having a decisive religious commitment.

A reason not to agree with McKim’s T-Principle rises when we realize that this principle applies far beyond the issue of religious diversity. Similar cultural diversities exist for a great many of our large-scale commitments. Our cultural contexts confront us with important alternatives in values, life goals, political policies, beliefs and acceptances, and all sorts of professional and private choices. These other views and pursuits are held and followed by people we realize to be as intelligent, sincere, and informed as are we. Given this situation, unless we have something like a “proof” of our position, which we seldom have, Mckim would have us adopt the great array of our commitments only tentatively, barring us from decisive commitments.

In fact, McKim’s T-Principle, when telling us how to relate to the myriad commitments that are the constituents of life, is telling us how to live our lives. When seeing it in this light, we have good reason to reject such a ban on decisive commitments. That is because so much of life gets its meaning precisely from the decisive commitments that carry us forward in roads taken, with other roads not taken now left behind. Large-scale tentative decisions do not have what it takes to grant a person a sense of a life well-lived, a life well-confronted. Decisive commitment is needed to look on one’s life as one’s own and as being engaged to its fullest. For that we need to commit beyond our knowledge and beyond disagreement with others. Imagine what life would look like were we to have to remain always open to switch to what peers are committed. Imagine the lack of robust engagement in such a life. Life is a gamble. You put your money down and go with it. The meaning in doing so is not only in hoping to be a winner, but in having put down the bet and living it out the best we can, if we can. Of course, we can change from one decisive commitment to another, but that can be because of what happens to us within our commitments and need not be because of an obligation to be on the lookout for a possible shift. Now, one of the most meaningful of all our commitments is our religious one. If you are a believer, your religion has high ranking in your life’s meaning. Decisive commitment to God and to self-transformation within a religious package can be the most decisive commitment one might have. And with it, life receives profound meaning.

Now, I am not arguing for pursuing meaning above all else, certainly not above established truth or above the most obvious of moral demands. Yet, I am proposing a practical, pragmatic, if you like “existential,” justification for validating decisive religious commitments in the face of religious diversity. The time for decisive life commitments comes early and cannot wait until it is too late. Pragmatic justifications figure elsewhere in epistemology, as for example, in William Alston’s pragmatic defense of following our doxastic practices although any justification for doing so will be circular14 and they should have an honored place in our epistemic desirata.

To sum it up, I have proposed distinguishing different forms of religious commitment: personal from grouply, and belief-based from acceptance-based. Given these distinctions I have argued, against the view of some, for recognizing the possibility and acceptability of types of tentative religious commitments. In addition, I have contended, on the other hand, that we should not accept McKim’s argument for the conclusion that religious commitment must not be decisive. I have proposed a pragmatic justification for just such commitments.

14See William P. Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) and Perceiving God ((Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991).