The Face of the Other as Human Facticity: From Husserlian Lebenswelt to Levinasian Alteritya

Introduction

This article aims to present the possibility of the connection among phenomenology, human facticity and ethics. The possibility of connection among the concepts becomes relevant from the Philosophy of Husserl and the Philosophy of Levinas, for both are inserted in the phenomenological theme. Levinas, having Husserl as his master, managed, based on his interpretations of some Husserlian concepts such as Lebenswelt and the “return to the same things”, to find in the Face of the Other a human facticity irreducible to any apprehension and understanding by the concept.

To demonstrate this idea, initially, some concepts from the Husserlian theory will be presented regarding Lebenswelt, the world of life, so that, after presenting the concepts described and interpreted by Levinas, which are in conformity with Husserl’s Philosophy, the conception that Levinas found in the Face of otherness an irreducible facticity is reached. Afterwards, it will be shown how phenomenology is related to ethics, based on the Levinasian theory of otherness irreducible to each and every concept.

Husserlian Phenomenology: An opening to Lebenswelt

Husserl, from “Logical Investigations” (Logische Untersuchungen) through “Ideas” (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie), “Cartesian Meditations” (Méditations Cartèsiennes), to “Crisis of European humanity and Philosophy” (Die Krisis des Europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie), at the same time that he seeks the cornerstone of science and knowledge, he also realizes that science had deviated itself from reason. Husserl’s observation was that science, although being of great relevance, ended up being reduced to mere knowledge of the facts and in view of that, reduced the human to simple things. For Husserl, the scientific activity, as an activity of reflection and reason, detached itself from the concrete world of individuals and their experiences. Thus, Husserl realized that this situation was the trigger for a crisis. For Husserl1, science did not have answers to people’s vital needs and therefore, lost the support object of his researches; that is, personal experiences, the intentionalities that motivated human action were not addressed by scientific knowledge. In this sense, there was, for Husserl2, the failure of rationalism, as well as of all rational culture. The reason that he had taken for himself the conduct of the world, of Philosophy, of scientification, failed when he forgot subjectivity, the human world, the subject acting in the world. Furthermore, for Husserl3, science, while endowed with strong objectivism, lost its ethical dimension, for it did not take a position on the world of ought-be. Therefore, science failed when it forgot Lebenswelt, as well as transcendental subjectivity.

In this sense, the world of life (Lebenswelt), according to Husserl, needs to be recovered. It is, according to Husserl, to affirm that there is a subjective, pre-scientific sphere of life. This pre-scientific sphere is characterized by being broader and richer than the objective world of science. It is argued, as Husserl writes, that prior to the scientific world, there is a world endowed with the complexity of the spirit of humanity; that is, a world based on the multiplicity and diversity of life, of actions, of interests that constitute the human. It is a world responsible for forming the unity of the human’s spiritual structure, that is, a world of values grounded in the sense of personal, individual, diversified and, at the same time, collective existence of human experiences. Given this,

1 Husserl, Edmund, (1996). Crise da Humanidade Europeia e a Filosofia [Crisis of European humanity and Philosophy]. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, p.50

2 Ibid., p.85

3 Ibid., p.46

there is, for Husserl4, a world prior to scientific knowledge and, at the same time, opposite to it, but which underlies it. In other words, it is Lebenswelt which needs to substantiate the sciences. According to Husserl, “Science itself emerges from something prior to itself, from the field of pre-scientific and pre-categorical experiences, that is, from a concrete a priori, which it calls Lebenswelt or Lebensumwelt. [...] The world of life is the source of the meaning of scientific concepts. If the latter cannot be referred, they are meaningless.”5 It is a world that is experienced, lived by people. A world in which people experience a diverse and complex reality. It turns out that this experience, which is encompassed by the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt, cannot be reduced to the mere sensitive experience that one has of the physical world. It is about affirming that the experience that the world of life requires is an experience that is linked to the act of consciousness, that is, an experience of concrete subjectivity. Therefore, the experience on which Lebenswelt is founded “is not a sum of objects (reduction of experiences to the world of physical-objective sciences) [but] the subjective world from which all human activity emerges.”6 Such a world that has its own meaning and purpose, from which concepts emerge. It is about affirming that the life is centered on the subjective dimension of the subject. In this sense, Husserl, in his philosophical works, defends “the return transcendental subjectivity, after all, it is she who can recover the sense of humanism and overcome the objectivist deviation.”7 Facing this observation, Husserl tried to formulate a phenomenology in a different way from what we had until now. Initially, in “Logical Investigations” as well as in “Ideas for a pure phenomenology”, the Husserlian phenomenology, as explained by Zahavi8, was purely descriptive. Afterwards, in “Cartesian Meditations”, in “Crisis of European Sciences” and in “Transcendental Phenomenology”, phenomenology turned to the analysis of the world of life. It is a matter of affirming that the Husserlian phenomenology received changes until it became a descriptive method that is based on describing the experiences, the lived and the world of life, returning to the pre-scientific world and then founding the sciences, knowledge and the scientific knowledge. When considering phenomenology as a method, the world of life is considered

4 Ibid., p.42-43

5 Ibid., p.42

6 Ibid., p.45

7 Ibid., p.46

8 Zahavi, Dan (2015). A fenomenologia de Husserl [The Fenomenology of Husserl]. Rio de Janeiro: Via Verita, p.209.

as a starting point, as it is not static, and is therefore always developing according to concrete subjectivity. Thus, “In the Husserlian phenomenology, the world of life has a dual function: a) the function of foundation in relation to the sciences; b) the function of a guiding thread for the return of phenomenology to the constitutive subjectivity of the world.”9 Therefore, phenomenology as a method, “Makes humanity appear as a single life of individuals and peoples, united by only spiritual relationships, with a diversity of types of humanity and culture, but which, through insensitive transitions, are attached to one another”.10 Given the fragment and what has been exposed so far, it is worth emphasizing, therefore, that phenomenology is focused on the human, on the characteristics inherent to people. Still, phenomenology is related to the social spirit, as well as to its configurations. It means to add that phenomenology is focused on the intentionality of the lived, that is, phenomenology does not turn to natural things as scientists do, but nourishes its look at phenomena, that is, “To the multiple subjective modes of donation thanks to which we are aware of the objects. [it is, here, an] intentional object, an object such as this subjectively manifests itself to a self, according to its different modes of donation or phenomena.”11 Therefore, what Husserl is trying to show is that phenomenology is responsible for preserving and welcoming the facticity that has the characteristic of being open to the human. For Husserl12 the phenomenology of the world of life is related to concrete human subjectivity, as a material to substantiate any and all objectivity. Given this, phenomenology is able to provide meaning and existential validity for the life of consciousness. Thus, with this new method, Husserl13 by closing the phenomenon in the immanent sphere of consciousness, without denying its relationship with the inner world, managed to study the phenomenon as it appears to consciousness, proposing the “return to the same things” and aiming at the study of how the being appears in the phenomenon itself. Therefore, Husserl

9 Husserl, Edmund (1996). Crise da Humanidade Europeia e a Filosofia [Crisis of European humanity and Philosophy]. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, p.46

10 Ibid., p.64

11 Husserl, Edmund (2006). Ideias para uma fenomenologia pura [Ideas for a pure phenomenology]. São Paulo: Ideias & Letras, p.16

12 Husserl, Edmund (1996). Crise da Humanidade Europeia e a Filosofia [Crisis of European humanity and Philosophy]. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, p.43

13 Ibid., p.17-18

sought to support a phenomenology of a transcendental and pure character, allowing it to have a relationship with ontology.

Thus, Husserl14 in “Paris Conferences”, defended the legitimacy of the “return to the things themselves or to the states of affairs in an original experience and evidence”, announcing that Logos, that any theory cannot ignore the pre-scientific life, life that is fully experienced outside or beyond the concept. Every theory, every Logos is only Logos when considering the experiences of otherness. Thus, Husserl intends to renew Philosophy, since by renewing Philosophy, science is renewed. It means to say that the renewal of science needs to contribute to the life that is lived fully, that is, it needs to contribute to human well-being and happiness, providing an improvement in the quality of life. In this sense, when Husserl proposes the “return to the same things”, he also proposes to abstain from the world and things as objects of transcendent experience. Therefore, Husserl intends to turn and orient himself towards the inner world, which he calls transcendental, to the detriment of the outer (transcendent) world. In this sense, Husserl proposes to explore the richness of transcendental consciousness, for, according to him, the philosopher does not need to resort to the transcendent world. Thus, Husserl15 seeks to describe the world as it appears in consciousness and by emphasizing the transcendental to the detriment of the transcendent, Husserl promotes an abstention regarding the outside world. This abstention is described by Husserl in the First Cartesian Meditation and is called “ir phenomenological epoché” (Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction). Then, phenomenology, when using epoché, discovers the transcendental subjectivity, purified from any and all empirical and natural world, being able to understand it in its original donation; that is, phenomenology is therefore understood, “As a descriptive analysis of the experiences of consciousness purified from their empirical elements to discover and learn the essences directly in intuition. The effect of epoché is the reduction to the transcendental sphere: pure experiences, pure consciousness with its pure correlates and its pure self.” 16 It is a matter of saying that it is possible, for Husserl, to describe the events of psychic life, of the subjects’ experiences. However, describing the subjects’ experiences depends on the subject being a concrete Self, capable of intending the world,

14 Husserl, Edmund (1929). Conferências de Paris. www.lusosofia.net p.4

15 Husserl, Edmund (1996). Crise da Humanidade Europeia e a Filosofia [Crisis of European humanity and Philosophy]. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, p.24

16 Ibid., p.24-25

of feeling, of taking part in the multiplicity and complexity of life. Therefore, when describing the experiences of the concrete self, it is possible to arrive at the world of facts. And, to reach the world of facts, is to reach a world of concrete human facticities, that is, as singular individualities, that is, sensations, feelings, perceptions, reflections, judgments, acts, actions, human experiences participating in the concrete world, the world that presents itself to the Self in which the Self is inserted. Therefore, to pay attention to the human facticities is to provide relevance to the experiences that are experienced by the Self. That is, the “Ego does not perceive itself only as the life that goes on, but also as the I, I who lives this or that, I identical who lives this or that cogito”17.

It is a matter of affirming that phenomenology is concerned with the concrete life of consciousness that is made up of facts, infinities, complexities and diversities that are always new, never fully understood by the Logos. Thus, phenomenology as conceived by Husserl conceived, implies on defending the life that is lived outside the Logos, outside of theory, for that life encompasses the multiplicity of subjects, as they are constituted for themselves. Therefore, for Husserl, there is an objective world, that is, a world of real and concrete experiences, in which each human person is seen and understood as a human person.

Having exposed the Husserlian phenomenology and how it provides relevance to Lebenswelt’s world of life, in the following items an approach will be presented on Levinas’ phenomenology and how he reaches the conception that the Other is an irreducible facticity to the Self, starting from Husserl.

Levinasian Phenomenology: Beyond Husserlian Heritage

Levinas, although having inherited the phenomenological method from Husserl and having a strong relationship with this method, in its Philosophy, he explores concepts and arguments that were not sought by the master. Thus, Levinas has philosophical peculiarities when compared to Husserl. These peculiarities can be seen in the various works of Levinas, especially in “Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology” (Théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl) and “Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger” (En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger), mainly in the following articles: “Reflections on the phenomenological technique”, “The Ruin of Representation”, “Intentionality and Metaphysics” and

17 Husserl, Edmund (2001). Meditações Cartesianas [Cartesian Meditations]. São Paulo: Madras, p.82 “Intentionality and Sensation”.

Although Husserl brought novelties to the way of philosophizing, formulating a new method – phenomenology – and making it inaugurate the analysis of consciousness so that the concepts, the Logos of science were founded and clarified from the pre-theoretical world, which is a source of fundamental concepts and theories, Levinas18, when interpreting Husserl, understands that the master, even if thanks to the phenomenological method, had discovered the pre-theoretical world, allowing the description of the experiences of concrete subjectivity, still remains related to the western philosophical tradition to which the primacy of the I denotes. In other words, for Levinas, even though Husserl provided, through the analysis of intuitions, a teaching about Being, as well as renewed the concept of transcendental when he presented phenomenology and when he made an argument that there is always something transcendent in the object when trying to apprehend it, even though Husserl defended the “return to the same things”, he suffers criticism, on the part of Levinas, that he still remained connected to the primacy of the I.19 However, although Levinas criticizes some aspects of the Husserlian theory, he takes advantage of other aspects, such as, transcendental reduction, facticity, intentionality and the very phenomenological sense provided by the new philosophical method.

It so happens that Levinas, as Husserl’s heir in the aspects exemplified above, went beyond the Husserlian Philosophy, concerned with an irreducible human facticity, centered in the Other, in the otherness. Therefore, according to Murakami20, phenomenological anthropology was the method of Levinas. Phenomenological anthropology is related to concrete situations and facts lived and experienced by singularity; that is, phenomenological anthropology is based on human life, on the human facticity that is lived concretely.

In this sense, in the interpretation of Murakami21, Levinas was not only limited to formulating a theory for the otherness, but was also concerned with a theory of the experience of the sensitive world, that is, of the world of life, of experiences of the Other, experiences of concrete

18 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). Intencionalidade e Metafísica. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Metaphysics. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget.

19 This understanding that Levinas has of Husserl is often based on readings that Heidegger presented on Husserl Philosophy.

20 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon.

21 Ibid., p.14-15.

subjectivity. Considering this, Murakami22 understands that Levinas, through the concept of the Other, of otherness, of proximity, discovered that the Other is not just a body, an ego, but is a singularity different from other singularities. It is to add that, for Murakami23, Levinas defends that the Other, that each subject, is an original and irreducible facticity, different from other facticities and, therefore, human subject, concrete subject, subject of concrete, pre-originated experiences.

This means that when Levinas presents the concept of radical otherness, of the Other, of human facticity, even if he asserts himself in the pre-theoretical world, as Husserl did, Levinas goes beyond the Husserlian phylosophy and, therefore, he already differs himself from Husserl. As previously written, the pre-theoretical world is a world essentially based on human experience. However, the human experience that phenomenology deals with is not related to classical empiricism and, therefore, the word “experience”, to phenomenology, does not mean that it is the fruits of any experience, of an “experience-that-aspires-to-a-truth.”24 The word experience here takes on a deeper and more original meaning. It is a conceptual turn, of a transcendental origin, which is made by phenomenology, showing that behavior and human acts are understood as an original experience. In this sense, the sensitive world, the world of life that is found with the Husserlian epoché, as well as the “return to the same things”, gain a prominent meaning for Levinas. In this way, because Levinas is concerned with the pre-theoretical world, he defends a radical and original subjectivity in the Face of the Other. In other words, for Levinas there is a “subjective domain more objective than any objectivity”25.

This idea brought up by Levinas, that there is a “more objective subjectivity than any objectivity” is related to phenomenology, considering that when it proposes the “return to the same things”, to the experiences of consciousness, it makes philosophical thinking go back to its origins, to reality; that is, Philosophy when considering phenomenology, would be based on the foundation of a common experience that would take into account all concrete subjects and no longer just singular theories without a common foundation. Furthermore, to affirm that there is a “subjective domain more objective than any objectivity” is to urge the conception

22 Ibid., p. 138

23 Ibid.

24 Levinas, Emmanuel (1965). Intencionalidade e Sensação. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Sensation. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p. 196

25 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). A ruína da representação. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger [The Ruin of Representation. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p. 159 that phenomenology allows “a reconstitution of the concrete being of the object, a return to everything that was forgotten in the attitude of fixation on the object”26 and, for this reason Levinas states that by resorting to more objective subjectivity than every concept, than every theory, than every objectivity, there is the mark of the transcendental activity that leads, in the Levinasian theory, as understood by Murakami27, to an unintentional consciousness. In this sense, Levinas differs from Husserl and, therefore, presents and defends a new phenomenological path. Phenomenological path that is based on unintentional consciousness.

Therefore, for Levinas, unintentional consciousness follows, from the point of view of disinterest, the constitution of the world and the flow of experiences and therefore, in this flow it does not participate directly. In this sense, an unintentional consciousness leads to the transcendental dimension, prior to Being and, consequently, leads to the way of the institution of concrete subjectivity and marks the subject’s uniqueness. In this sense, a pre-theoretical life, a truly concrete life is presented to concrete subjectivity. According to Levinas28 “It is a life of action and feeling, of will and aesthetic judgement, of interest and disinterest, etc. From the outside, the correlative world of this life, an object of theoretical contemplation, but also a world of meaning, a world of action, beauty and goodness.” Thus, even though conscience is unintentional, according to Murakami29 an immediate and internal perception to the subject, it is given to the intentional act. However, when Levinas interprets Husserl, this giving to the intentional act does not mean affirming the correlation between subject and object, leading to an ideal unity of multiplicity. Following this interpretation, intentionality, even if it carries out a subjective movement, a transcendental movement, it is not guided by Being, but by the Other, by otherness. In the words of Levinas30: “The other guides the transcendental movement

26 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). Reflexões sobre a “Técnica Fenomenológica”. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Reflections on “Phenomenological Technique”. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p. 141

27 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon.

28 Levinas, Emmanuel (1984). Théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl [Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology”]. Paris: Vrin, 1984, p. 75-76

29 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon, p.57

30 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). Intencionalidade e Metafísica. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Metaphysics. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p.167.

without offering itself to the vision, which, precisely, would always be overflowed by the very transcendental movement that it should define. The transcendental movement now receives a totality different structure from the subject-object polarization, which characterizes intuition. The great contribution of the Husserlian phenomenology is due to this idea that intentionality or the relationship with otherness is not immobilized by polarizing itself as a subject-object.” Therefore, realizing that phenomenology, when taking into account the interpretations promoted by Levinas, based on the Husserlian phenomenology, ends up possessing the intentionality related to praxis and no longer in an objective intentionality. In this sense, when relating intentionality to praxis, Levinas proposes an original intentionality, developing what Husserl’s phenomenology had implied. In this bias, for Levinas, the original intentionality aims to rehabilitate the sensitive and provide primordial space to sensitivity.

Therefore, as Levinas31 interprets from Husserl, sensitivity is a principle, a first impression (Urimpresion32). It is the here and now, the absolute beginning, the individuation of the subject, the origin of the sensitive, of the pre-theoretician that underlies every concept. It is the origin, it is the “ground zero” of pre-theoretical life. It is about emphasizing that sensitivity, as Urimpresion, as exposed by Levinas33 from Husserl’s interpretation, “marks the subjective character of the subject” and, therefore, is here related to the original intentionality. In that sense, Urimpresion, “What is anticipated thanks to habit [...] does not make sense here. Everything that happens to the original impression is, by definition, new, for it has no anticipation on the horizon. The original impression always welcomes the surprising. Here we can evoke the term by H. Maldiney: Transpassibility. The original impression as an absolute gift is permissible to the unexpected event, that is, to the transpossible [...] of the original impression in the temporal flow, it is the meeting of the dimension of the symbolic identity and the proto-symbolic dimension of the original

31 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). Reflexões sobre a “Técnica Fenomenológica”. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Reflections on “Phenomenological Technique”. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p. 141

32 The concept of Urimpresion is found in Husserl’s writings. However, levinas, when studying Husserl and interpreting it, takes this concept into consideration, marking subjectivity, original intentionality, time.

33 Levinas, Emmanuel (1959). Reflexões sobre a “Técnica Fenomenológica”. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Reflections on “Phenomenological Technique”. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p. 144 impression”.34 Thus, for Levinas, according to Murakami35, there is a fundamental interaction structure, which will mark the flow of consciousness and, consequently, appeal to subjectivity. In this bias, temporality and concrete subjectivity are related. However, Levinas36, in the text “Intentionality and Sensation”, in some way, continues to interpret Husserl from the “Lessons for a phenomenology of the intimate time consciousness” and writes that Husserl37 understands that “the conscience of... here is the flow”. In this sense, time is related to the flow of consciousness. Thus, for Levinas based on Husserl’s interpretation, time would already be diachronic, after all, from the spontaneous genesis there would be “receptivity of an ‘other’ that penetrates the ‘same’.”38 Therefore, this “other” that penetrates the “same”, this understanding of a diachronic time, leads to the Levinasian phenomenology.

In addition, it is relevant to state that, for Levinas, concrete subjectivity is related to temporality. Therefore, Levinas, when dealing with time related to the flow of consciousness, presents the concept of a diachronic time. Thus, subjectivity is diachrony and, consequently, diachrony is a structure that makes it possible to encounter the most contingent contingency, that is, with the Other, without reducing it. For the philosopher, diachronic time does not mean an irreducible temporality, impossible to synchronize, but refers to the proto-impression, to the spontaneous genesis, where the figure of the Other is already foreseen. And, when it comes to the figure of the Other, in the conception of Levinas, one is, therefore, dealing with ethics.

Facticity, Phenomenology and Ethics: Connection Centered on the Face of Alterity

To reflect on the relationship between phenomenology and ethics, as well as with human facticity, it is necessary to state that, as Levinas39 is concerned with finding a human facticity that is irreducible to ontology, then it is necessary

34 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon, p.48-49

35 Ibid., p.35

36 Levinas, Emmanuel (1965). Intencionalidade e Sensação. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Sensation. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget.

37 Husserl, Edmund (1996). Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps [The Phenomenology of Internal Time Counsciouness] Paris: PUF.

38 Levinas, Emmanuel (1965). Intencionalidade e Sensação. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Sensation. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p.189

39 Levinas, Emmanuel (2002). De Deus vem à Ideia. [Of God that comes to mind]. Petrópolis: Vozes, p. 41

to deal with the concept of awakening. For Levinas, the transcendental Husserlian reduction would be an awakening, a démarche40, which breaks with the identity of the Being, that is awakening breaks with the Same. To break with the Same is to break with totality, with thematization, it is to awaken to life, to human experiences. Awakening implies making several and new “reductions” so that the totalizing Same is not returned, but that “numbed intentions are reactivated, forgotten horizons are reopened [by the concept], disconcerting the Same within its identity.”41 Thus this awakening would also break with the rationality that is anchored in knowledge (connaître), in certainties, in concepts. Awakening the Self would be to revive it for concrete life, for the concrete human horizons that were lost in the anonymity of the Being. Awakening would therefore be to uproot and pull out the Self from its land. It would be to question him in his self-identity. To awaken, therefore, as Levinas writes, is to have in us an unavoidable idea. It is being taken by the thought that allows one to think more than one can think. It is an idea that means, “A significance prior to the presence, to all presence, prior to all origin in consciousness and, thus, anarchic. [...] Idea which means by a significance older than its exhibition, which does not end with the exhibition, which does not take its meaning from its manifestation, thus breaking with the coincidence of Being and of appearing in which for Western Philosophy, lies the sense or the rationality.”42 From this fragment, Murakami43, when interpreting Levinas, adds that Being is awakened by something or by someone other than oneself. The awakening of Being, its uprooting, is external. The awakening, for Murakami44 designates, above all, the transcendental moment that provides the production of multiplicity and human differences. In this sense, the awakening brings the liveliness of life to Levinas45. Therefore, for the philosopher, awakening implies not-rest. With the awakening, the totality of the Same, thematization and the Being are questioned and, then, here the ontology is broken by the Other. The Self, therefore, formerly rooted in its land, unravels its identity and its being, leaves the Same, for it was awakened by the

40 Ibid., p.49

41 Ibid., p.49

42 Ibid., p.97

43 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon, p.299

44 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002). Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon, p.299

45 Levinas, Emmanuel (2002). De Deus vem à Ideia. [Of God that comes to mind]. Petrópolis: Vozes, p. 52 Other, by otherness. At that moment, there is what Levinas46 calls transcendence in immanence, because in awakening, made by the Other to the Same, there is an always open relationship, in which the Other is not reduced to the Same, nor to its identification, nor to its reconciliation. Awakening makes the Same neither assimilate the Other nor alienate it. And the Same does not suffer assimilation either, it is only called to maintain a close relationship with the Other. This relationship is to be awakened by the Other. The awakening for Levinas47 is not interpreted as intentionality. Awakening represents an irreducible alterity to Being, an alterity that resists all synchronization, that resists thematization. It resists the noema-noese notion. Thus to be awakened by the Other is to be awakened by the Face, it is to be in proximity to the neighbor, in exchange with the Other, totality irreducible to the Self.

Awakening is also, as exposed by Levinas48, to be facing an original transcendence that is based on concrete, based on a human facticity that is shown in the Face of the Other. Thus, the Face is not responsible for synthesizing as if it united each part to the whole. The Face, as Levinas49 writes, in the work “Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority”, refers to the Other, the one who comes from the infinite and “makes me the face”. The Face is expressed. It refuses to encompass, refuses to understand, even refuses to compare. The Face is an absolute difference, it is asymmetry that comes from the height, it is non-violence and, therefore, when annoucing the ethical inviolability of otherness, it brings with it the institution of the concrete subject, as a concrete human singularity and the foundation of concrete human experiences, prior to the Logos and the concept. The Face, as understood by Levinas50 is an original expression, and therefore, ethical resistance. So, all uniqueness, all human facticity is already ethical and, at the same time, Face. In this sense, as the Face refers to a concrete, human facticity that is irreducible to Being and, and so as it brings ethics, for Levinas, there is the institution of a concrete subject understood as a human singularity. A subject who has a diverse and irreducible facticity to any and all other facticities. A subject that is unique. In this sense, the Face manifests itself as the facticity of the Other and is found in its ethical significance. Therefore, the phenomenological opening promoted by Levinas is defined as the institution of the concrete subject. Subject of oneness, subject of “flesh

46 Ibid., p.44

47 Ibid., p.214

48 Ibid., p.181

49 Levinas, Emmanuel (2011) Totalidade e Infinito: Ensaio sobre a Exterioridade [Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority]. Lisboa: Edições 70.

50 Ibid.

and blood”. In view of this, Murakami51 understands that Levinas was the philosopher who really provided relevance to otherness, discovering the path of existence of an original and irreducible facticity. This means that the formulation of the concept of original facticity refers to the institution of a concrete subject; that is, a subject with an irreducible human singularity, incomprehensible in the face of all other facticities. In the words of Murakami52 “Levinas’s great Discovery regarding the question of the relationship with the Other, is that the Other is not only the other Leib, the other ego (another ground zero like me), but he is always considered a facticity (singularity in its uniqueness and contingency with the possibility of meaning) and that this facticity [...] is categorically distinguished from my facticity and the facticity of the phenomena of the world. The Other’s facticity has a different structure from my facticity. [...] Levinas discovered the original and irreducible facticity.” Therefore, if phenomenology, since Husserl, has as its object the life that is experienced in the pre-theoretical with anchoring in praxis, in the emotion and in the valorization of the original human experiences, then, for Levinas, as a reader and critic of Husserl, human experiences have their origin in the subjective (subjectivity). Thus, as Levinas53 has already discovered that human facticity is irreducible to any and all other facticities, then, for him, phenomenology aims to reactivate the sensitive horizon, the forgotten horizon in which this facticity is anchored. There is, according to Levinas, the idea that phenomenology depends on concrete life and, in this perspective, phenomenology is revealed as facticity. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between phenomenology and facticity. Facticity that is revealed in the concrete life of the subjects and consequently, there is a subjectivity that is always transcendental. However, while Husserl understands this facticity related to ontology, Levinas places it beyond the Being. There is, for Levinas, a facticity that reveals itself as pure otherness. At this point, Levinas already differs from Husserl. As he already differentiates himself from Husserl, Levinas already announces that ontology has always considered the otherness in the concept and that, therefore, “returning to the same things” is not turning to Being, but turning beyond it. Therefore, “to return the same things” is to return to otherness, to the Other as the Face manifests, which is irreducible otherness to the whole totality. In this sense, it is only from the Other, from the Face that precedes any philosophical discourse that

51 Murakami, Yasuhiko (2002) Levinas Phénoménologue [Phenomenologist Levinas]. Paris: Editions Jérôme Millon, p. 138

52 Ibid., p.138

53 Levinas, Emmanuel (1965) Intencionalidade e Sensação. In: Descobrindo a existência com Husserl e Heidegger. [Intencionality and Sensation. In: Discovering Existence with Husserl and Heidegger] Lisboa: Instituto Piaget, p.178 ethics may come. Thus, it is clear that the Face is the bearer of “the very things”, of irreducible alterity to any and all Logos. The Face brings the experiences of the Other. The Face is a phenomenon and promotes ethics. For Levinas54, as Husserl presents, “phenomenology constitutes for people a way of existing in which they fulfill their destiny of spirit”. However, fulfilling the destiny of spirit means that phenomenology provides a basis for ethics, allowing subjects become aware of themselves and, consequently, take responsibility for themselves. In this sense, phenomenology is concerned with what is experienced, with sensations. It is given that phenomenology, when giving meaning to spiritual life, to ethical life, is defined by experiences, by the “return to the same things” and not by reflective thinking, nor by simple empirical thinking. In this sense, what can be seen is that there is a relationship between human facticity (understood in the figure of the Face, of otherness) with phenomenology and ethics.

Conclusion

In this article, it was observed that Husserl’s phenomenology was extremely relevant to Levinas, as it served as a basis for Levinas to present and develop many of his themes. Therefore, in principle, it was necessary to bring some ideas, passages and arguments about the Husserlian Philosophy, so that afterwards Levinas could, initially, starting from interpretations he made about the master’s Philosophy, announce, in a brief way, that, when adopting the phenomenological method, dealt with the problem of the Other, of otherness. At that moment, Levinas understood that consciousness is unintentional, and that from that point on, the experiences of otherness are considered original experiences, after all, they contain an infinite multiplicity and wealth. Therefore, when discovering and describing the human facticity irreducible to any concept, facticity centered on otherness, Levinas calls for ethics centered on the Face of the Other.