Science Teaching, Disagreements and Intellectual Autonomy

Introduction

The central objective of this work is to present the discussion around the theme “the purpose of science teaching” in the light of an epistemological approach, in order to verify how this debate reverberates in the teaching of chemistry. This discussion refers to the area of science didactics and has a broad contribution from scientists, educators and philosophers of science [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].

In the current discussion scenario, there is a diversity of positions about the goal of science education [3, 7] maintain that the goal of science education should be a change in students’ beliefs. Others argue that science education should aim primarily at students’ understanding of the objects that science proposes (scientific theories, models, laws, postulates, and concepts), as pointed out by Cobern WW , Smith MU and Siegel H, Hoffmann M [2, 5, 6]. Ferreira TAS, et al. [9] argue that the debate about the goals of science education involves at least a combination of moral and epistemic elements. In addition, they consider understanding and knowledge as primary goals. For Ferreira TAS [8], the goal of science education is the formation of the student’s virtuous character.

Given this discussion, in which different theses are defended, the question is: what does a student, considered as an epistemic agent, learn? For Santos WLP and Schnetzler RP [10], the function of teaching chemistry involves developing the ability to make decisions. In this perspective, “the teaching of science should lead the student to experience situations that provide the development of the ability to judge, evaluate and position” (p. 1) [11]. On this aspect, (p. 15) Ferreira TAS [8] argues that “understanding can be qualified as the virtue of a subject that can reflect on its own understanding, taking responsibility for their beliefs formed in light of this reflection”.

For Libâneo JC [12], the purpose of education is relevant because it expresses, intentions, well-defined and explicit purposes regarding the development of skills developed by students during their training process (for example, cognitive, physical, affective, aesthetic and ethical) to act as a citizen in society. To reach this point, [13] reflecting on the relationship between intellectual virtues and the preparation for the exercise of citizenship, defends the thesis that considers intellectual virtues as the end of education. In this sense, the author argues: P1. If virtues of intellectual character are a primary source of preparing people for the exercise of citizenship and preparation for the exercise of citizenship is an end of education, then virtues of intellectual character should be taken as a primary focus of education.

P2. Virtues of intellectual character are a primary source of preparing people for the exercise of citizenship and preparation for the exercise of citizenship is an end of education. Therefore, C1. Intellectual virtues should be taken as a primary focus of education (modus ponens, P1, P2). (p. 171) [13].

For the author, intellectual virtues are character traits and cognitive excellences constitutive of the intellectual maturation process of the individual. For Borba AZ [13], such virtues can be understood as a regulating ideal of education from official education documents. “This means that the notion of intellectual virtue provides the field of education with an evaluation standard against which to assess the reasonableness and desirability of curricula, teaching methods, learning tests, etc” (p. 208) [14].

What we see in the debates is that there is no consensus within virtue epistemology about what an intellectual virtue is, as Zagzebski L [15] suggests. However, authors who discuss the importance of virtues in philosophical work agree that intellectual virtues express a given type of cognitive excellence. Among the types of cognitive excellence are cognitive faculty, intellectual talent, and intellectual ability [13, 16, 17, 18, 19]. It is worth noting that cognitive faculties are not always cognitive excellences. An agent may, for example, not observe well, reason poorly, not have a good memory, make mistakes, and so on.

For Borba AZ [13], the concept of intellectual virtue is the central concept for addressing problems and topics in virtue epistemology. The scope of problems depends on the epistemological program in which the epistemologist wishes to research. To a large extent, virtue epistemology has two distinct directions: the Confiabilist Epistemology of Virtue (linked to the theoretical positions of Ernest Sosa and John Greco), which focuses on cognitive faculties, and the Responsibilist Epistemology of Virtue (linked to the positions of Linda Zagzebski and Jonathan Kvanvig), which focuses on character traits. In this sense, intellectual virtues are character traits linked to the pursuit of distinctly intellectual goods, such as knowledge, understanding, among others1.

There are at least two virtue theses: the confiabilist and the responsible thesis. They are distinct theses because they deal with different aspects, despite using the same term. On the one hand, for the confiabilists, the concept of intellectual virtue comprises: (a) the concept of intellectual virtue involves cognitive faculties (e.g., memory, perception, and intuition); (b) an epistemic agent is not necessarily

1 On the relation between intellectual virtue and epistemic good, I will deal with this later.

responsible for the possession or operation of intellectual virtues and vices; (c) intellectual virtues (under certain conditions) are trustworthy dispositions (conducive to truth); (d) the value of intellectual virtues is instrumental. On the other hand, for the accountabilists, this same concept is understood as: (a) qualities from habits; (b) an epistemic agent is responsible for the possession or operation of intellectual virtues and vices; (c) only personal qualities;

(d) intellectual virtues have intrinsic value [20]. In this paper, however, the notion of virtue will be understood in only one way: via the accountability perspective.

Since the aim of the research is to consider intellectual autonomy as one of the goals of science education, this work is aligned as a special case of virtue epistemology accountability. For a Responsibilist, virtues would have little definition based on the content of dispositions (i.e. whether they produce truth or not) and a strong commitment to the way in which relations are established in the community of people acting in groups. It is the epistemic community that establishes the criteria for someone to be considered responsible in a given context. (p. 96-97) [8].

In fact, this is a work that seeks to contribute to the character-based “accountable” virtue epistemology, which is a perspective of epistemology that emphasizes reflection on the virtues of intellectual character, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, rigor, and above all, autonomy. In dialogue with [8, 13, 21, 22, 23], I present what would come into play in science teaching with the virtue of autonomy. To illustrate a central theme of Chemistry teaching, I will use as an example the “epistemic disagreement” about the concept of molecular structure.

In terms of epistemic disagreement, [4] argument consists in allowing for the possibility that two or more people can reasonably disagree about a given proposition even when they have equivalent evidence (arguments, information, facts) regarding that proposition. In this sense, one of the central problems in the epistemology of disagreement consists in answering the following question: what rational attitude should epistemic pairs take when they both hold different views? Here, disagreement becomes epistemologically interesting because epistemic pairs participate in it, as we will explain later. A priori, it is understood that epistemic parity involves an epistemic symmetry around a given issue, in a way that this happens via equality in terms of cognitive capacity and access to relevant evidence and arguments.

For Baehr J [14], the problem of disagreement is one of the most investigated topics in contemporary social epistemology. In this sense, the subject occupies the expressive agenda of discussion of analytical epistemology, because it has a direct link with a widely discussed and debated topic among philosophers: the epistemic justification. Epistemic justification is linked to the problem of whether an agent can resort to reasons to justify his cognitive states. In the philosophical literature, there are arguments for and against the notion that a cognitive agent has transparent and privileged epistemic access to these cognitive states. Such states address the question of whether or not we have the intellectual ability to list reasons that can justify our beliefs.

Roughly speaking, epistemic justification means that in order for us to regard any state as knowledge, rational arguments must be presented, content in relation to which the subject is conscious and which are conducive to justifying the truth of the belief [24]. Goldman A [25] adds that justification must be understood as a matter of “reasons” rather than causes. Here, belief must be the fruit of inquiry.

In general, justification means that regarding any state as knowledge implies that rational arguments are made. In this sense, the arguments are in favor of the truth of the belief, rather than a mere figment of chance. A rational agent is one who has control over his own beliefs and his actions are guided in the light of these beliefs. In other words, the notion of justification is linked to an agent’s ability to judge. It is worth noting that there is a difference between being justified and justifying: “Being justified” is a state, whereas the term “justifying” refers to an action (or activity) that involves the evaluation and reflection on something.

About the notion of autonomy, I believe that its unity is related to something that gives motivation to act and that passes the sieve of judgment. There are situations where the subject in a unity encounters conflict: Drive or adherence? To believe or not to believe? I think that the autonomous subject, can conduct himself to maintain (or not) the beliefs already supported by reasons. Moreover, to believe or not to believe is not the goal, but in terms of the ethics of belief: what is required for us to believe or what sanctions something.

There are different ways of defining intellectual autonomy. The concept of intellectual autonomy is one that can lead to a number of issues if taken to an extreme. For example, (p.225) Fricker E [26], describes an “autonomous knower” based on Descartes and Locke as one who “does not take anyone’s word for it, but accepts only what he has discovered for himself, relying only on his own cognitive faculties and investigative and inferential powers.” Descartes explicitly defended this ideal and method in his Meditations [27]. Locke likewise rejected “the opinions of other men floating in his brain” as not constituting knowledge [28].

This extreme purism restricts very severely how much one can come to know [26].

The conflict surrounding the notion of intellectual autonomy is whether or not it involves trust in others [26, 29, 30]. According to Zagzebski L [30], intellectual autonomy is the right or ideal of self-direction in acquiring and maintaining beliefs. For the philosopher, the acquisition or maintenance of beliefs, is the arena in which autonomy is exercised. In this sense, the author argues: Since intellectual autonomy is the exercise of self-management in our beliefs, epistemic self- confidence is a necessary condition for intellectual autonomy. I think this point can be generalized. Autonomy requires confidence in the connection between the conscious use of all one’s powers - perceptual, epistemic, affective, conative - and success in achieving the basic ends of those powers. Self-confidence is a necessary and critical condition for autonomy and, by the same token, it is a necessary and critical condition for being a self. (p. 259) [30].

Characterizes “a self” as being aware of oneself, including awareness of different mental states, and also beliefs, desires, emotions, sensations, attitudes, judgments, and decisions. For her, a conscious self-reflective person is committed to authority in the realm of belief. Epistemic as well as emotional self-confidence is rational and inevitable. Moreover, epistemic self-confidence is consistent and commits us to trust others, so that some of these others satisfy conditions for epistemic authority [30]. Baehr J [21], supported by the Kantian definition of thinking for oneself, considers that there would be intellectual autonomy and an agency when an agent can defend a belief from the support of reasons, endorsed in a reflexive way. For Baehr J [21], as for Zagzebski L [30], intellectual autonomy occurs based on the defense of a belief, through reasons that are presented to our self.

From another point of view, Roberts RC and Woody WJ [29] supported by an individualistic autonomy, consider that intellectual autonomy as a virtue means that the subject must on his or her own seek to reflect, analyze evidence, and reach his or her own conclusions. This autonomy can be exemplified in the student or researcher who is able to act on his own. From this perspective, the notion of autonomy would be a willingness to use one’s reason ‘’without direction from another” [29].

Imagine first the person who is self-governing ‘’ all the way down’’. He is the sole unaided author (or at least the original discoverer) of all the logical rules he uses, all the experimental patterns, all the vocabulary of inquiry, all the guiding questions he addresses - that is, of everything that regulates his intellectual practices. This pattern is not an inheritance. He has discovered for himself the entire factual background that regulates any current investigation, and he has worked out for himself all the explanations that any current investigation presupposes. He is the complete autodidact, having never had a teacher other than himself, with literally no one to thank for his intellectual powers and accomplishments. He has never darkened the door of a university or any other school. He works entirely alone, never consulting colleagues, never listening to criticism from others, never reading what others have written (p. 259) [29].

For Roberts RC and Woody WJ [29], regardless of how the virtue of autonomy has been interpreted, it has been conceived as a proper ability to think for oneself and not be unduly dependent on or influenced by others. In my view, the positions of Roberts RC and Woody WJ [29] seem to be a misunderstanding. I think that we should not consider the extreme and caricatured form of the autonomous subject. Rather, what allows a subject to be autonomous is not isolation, but interactions - with epistemic sources of other people, for example, teachers, researchers, physicists, chemists, and mathematicians as occurs in the educational process. This thinking considers social relations relevant for intellectual autonomy, enabling them [30]. My position is that the notion of intellectual autonomy involves trust in others, being something absolutely necessary.

We are, in a sense, epistemically dependent on each other. For example, much of the knowledge we have comes from the testimony and words of other people. It is hard to see how we could, even ideally, obtain knowledge through our own intellectual efforts, i.e., intuitively, not everyone can be a chemist, a physicist, a mathematician, a historian, a researcher, and so on [30]. The autonomous epistemic agent is the subject who relies on the intellectual work of others in order to achieve epistemic goods.

In a broader sense, autonomy is conceived in this thesis as a virtue or a quality. When I consider an agent to have a virtue, I want to argue that he has a disposition to be motivated in a certain way and to act in a given way in relevant circumstances, and, furthermore, he is successful in achieving the end of his virtuous motive [30]. Virtues can be understood as relatively stable dispositions to think and/or act well, where the disposition is not just a capacity to do something, but a capacity combined with a propensity to do it [20]. That is, virtues are not mere capacities; they involve a motivational component. Here, critical-reflective action is essential for the formation of a responsible epistemic agent. And, in this sense, responsibility implies autonomy.

To illustrate this idea, I use a circumstance in which the “disagreement about the subject: molecular structure - reducible or non-reducible to quantum theory”?.

The problem of molecular structure is widely discussed. In the debates that have taken place, two major groups stand out: (a) the reductionists and (b) the non-reductionists. In general, reductionists hold the view that the concepts of chemistry can be explained by the postulates of physics, especially, by Quantum Theory [31, 32, 33, 34]. Here, there are authors who advocate the reconstruction of the concept of molecular structure within the framework of the quantum theory of atoms into molecules. Others, while acknowledging the conceptual discontinuity between quantum mechanics and molecular chemistry, keep alive the hope for future reduction. Currently, the most strongly emphasized reductionist strategy is that represented by the so-called Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules (QTAIM), proposed by Bader in the 1990, [35] maintain that the concept of molecular structure seems to find no place in the ontology described by quantum mechanics since it appeals to classical notions such as the position of atomic nuclei or the individuality of electrons. Trindle C [36] also asserts the viability of the question: does the concept of molecular structure survive beyond the Born-Oppenheimer approach? For Kelly T [37], although this approximation is a powerful tool, it is insufficient to think the problem of molecular structure.

Given this scenario, in which two (or more) agents hold different beliefs about the same subject, having access to the same evidence (i.e., arguments, information, and phenomena), and approximately the same abilities (e.g., reasoning ability, reflection, criticality, etc.), what is the most rational attitude the agent should adopt in the face of this disagreement? (a) Continue to believe what he believed. (b) Decrease confidence in his own initial belief. (c) Suspend judgment.

Faced with the available attitudes, there are two possible theses: the conciliationist and the anticonciliationist. In this paper, I will be arguing in favor of the anti-conciliationist thesis and how it is linked to ontological pluralism, bringing contributions to the teaching of science, in particular, to the teaching of chemistry [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43].

Faced with the available attitudes, there are two possible theses: the conciliationist and the anticonciliationist. In this paper, I will be arguing in favor of the anti-conciliationist thesis and how it is linked to ontological pluralism, bringing contributions to the teaching of science, in particular, to the teaching of chemistry.

The problem is that the discussion about molecular structure (when it happens) runs through the debates within the philosophy of science, especially in the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of chemistry, and is not usually part of the school and university curricula. Although the problem has attracted the attention of several authors, the discussion is far from being resolved. However, this does not mean that there are not good reasons to defend a certain philosophical position or to offer a different way of argumentation to reflect on the problem. In this paper, my goal is to argue in favor of the position that the concept of molecular structure is not reducible to quantum theory for specific reasons. Moreover, I seek to consider that there would be a great benefit for the teaching of science, especially for the teaching of chemistry, to have this dispute as an object of study in terms of intellectual autonomy.

Taking the case of molecular structure, my initial argument consists in considering that, in order to participate in a rational disagreement, we must be intellectually and morally prepared for the nature of this debate. This attitude implies a careful evaluation of the reasons surrounding the problem, being open to (or accepting) the rules of the epistemic game, submitting to the light of reason, and not imposing oneself by force. But, for this, it is necessary that we have a virtue: intellectual autonomy.

From this, I will defend the thesis that considers that one of the goals of science teaching is the formation of a critical agent with intellectual autonomy. Here, a critical subject is one who seeks to discuss the reasons, submitting them to the sieve of reason, that is, the arguments for or against [44]. In this sense: The gain can be direct: when the person discards unsatisfactory reasons and finds assurances to believe or disbelieve. It can also be indirect: leading to a more demanding attitude, distrustful of certain statements, yet curiously and open-minded, becoming more able to understand positions different from one’s own. This form of disagreement can be found in everyday life as well as in philosophy (p. 117) [44].

Therefore, it is considered that the notion of intellectual or epistemic autonomy, as well as disagreement and reflection, can contribute with answers to the obstacles partially discussed in this master’s thesis. Thus, I argue, with [8, 21, 22] that one of the goals of science teaching is intellectual autonomy. The entire argumentative path of this thesis seeks to explore reasons why the goal of science education should include something like autonomy. The student, in this perspective, is an autonomous, virtuous, critical and reflective agent constructor of knowledge.

The Reflective-Theoretical Method

This work is eminently theoretical-reflexive in nature, for its value and normativity. According to Ferreira TAS, Matos MS [45], theoretical-reflective research is divided into at least three categories: conceptual, theoretical and philosophical research. Conceptual research seeks to investigate a concept. The intention is to assess whether there are (or not) problems in its definition or in the relationship it has with other concepts in the formation of a given theory [46].

Thus, the central concept is molecular structure. My intention is to verify the controversy surrounding the discussion of this concept and how it relates (or not) to the theory in focus: the quantum theory. This study focuses on the following question: molecular structure - reducible or non-reducible to quantum theory? I draw on the argumentation of the concept in order to present a theoretical and critical discussion, guided primarily by the specialized literature of contemporary philosophy, seeking to understand a relationship that I consider fruitful between Social Epistemology and science teaching.

The theoretical research deals with conceptual categories, but is not restricted to their analysis. For Dittrich A (p. 20) [47], this research is “dedicated to reconstruct theory, concepts, ideas, ideologies, polemics, with a view, in immediate terms, to improving theoretical foundations.” Therefore, it requires: conceptual rigor, a more refined analysis, lines of argumentation, and explanatory capacity. Philosophical research deals with the epistemic conditions of a given scientific field, which seeks to reflect on the ethics of the way we conduct (scientific) research and assesses the assumptions on which a given science is based.

The character of philosophical research is reflexive and its propositions often normative. This means that science can offer a good description of how things are, but it is in the realm of philosophical ethical reflection that we can argue about how things should be. This prescriptive reflection cannot be sufficiently investigated by some empirical expedient, and is therefore philosophical. (p. 22-23) [46].

The normative condition refers to prescriptive reasons, that is, they suggest something about what could be [48]. In this context, philosophical arguments are normative . Evaluating an argument involves looking at the reasons invoked and the way they are organized in the argument. According to Goldman A [49], the structure of a philosophical argument is formed by three conditions: syntactic (logical), semantic (meaningful) and pragmatic (operational). I share their views because I believe, as do these authors, that the tools to evaluate a good philosophical argument are: reason, intuition, relative ability, communication, emotion, and imagination; they underlie and give reasons for what should be ideal. Thus, the guarantee of the argument is based on good reasons to justify it.

Epistemic Disagreements and the Objective of Science Teaching: the case of Chemistry Teaching

There is much discussion on the topic: what is the objective of science teaching? In this section, I briefly introduce the debate [4, 6, 7, 8, 13]. I then expose the problem of disagreement as a topic within the scope of Social Epistemology [4,38,39,50-58,] . It is worth emphasizing that I am not considering that all problems in the teaching of chemistry are objects of disagreement; that would be counterintuitive and anti-Kuhn, i.e., if there are only disagreements we would not have normal science and consequently it could not be taught. My goal is to use the disagreement around the problem of molecular structure to illustrate the idea of autonomy as I will do later.

Conciliationism x Anticonciliationism

The disagreement problem can be described as follows: suppose that after a thorough investigation of a topic (e.g., molecular structure - reducible or non-reducible to quantum theory?), two agents considered as epistemic pairs discover that they have distinct beliefs in the face of the same evidence. Agent X comes to the conclusion that B (i.e., that the concept of molecular structure is reducible to quantum theory) and agent Y comes to the conclusion that ~B (i.e., that the concept of molecular structure is not reducible to quantum theory).

Agents X and Y then find that in the face of the same evidence, they both come to opposite conclusions. After the discovery of the disagreement between epistemic pairs, the question is: what is the most rational action to take? (a) Continue to believe the initial belief. (b) Reduce the degree of confidence of the belief. (c) Suspend judgment.

In this case, it is a scenario involving rational epistemic agents and what they should do in the face of disagreement. But why is this a problem in the disagreement literature? According to the epistemology of disagreement, besides the epistemic agents offering arguments that support their own beliefs, the question is whether the disagreement itself is evidence that was not available to both.

In this scenario, we have two distinct theses: the conciliationist and the anti-conciliationist. Both presuppose rationality, intellectual autonomy, intellectual virtues, and are rationally justified positions. Neither of them defend intellectually vicious positions. They are distinct theses because they deal with the problem of disagreement differently.

In view of this, each thesis seeks to explain why its viewpoint is the most rational. This implies that, from the agent’s perspective, it is rational both to maintain its starting belief (without changing the degree of trust) and to reconcile it with its peer [38, 39, 35, 52, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73]. For authors like Christensen D [70, 71] and Feldman R, Kelly T, Chisholm R [52, 72, 73], the most rational position in disagreements is to take the conciliationist view. In this view, it is generally held that in cases of disagreements between epistemic peers we should revise the justification of our beliefs, give weight to the view of the opponent in the dispute, reduce somewhat the degree of confidence of the belief or even suspend judgment in a dispute.

According to Feldman R, Kelly T, Chisholm R [52, 72, 73], disagreement shows us that our belief may not be so secure, and that in the context of disagreement, we may have made some mistake in evaluating the evidence. For [52], disagreement is evidence of our fallibility and thus an opportunity for epistemic improvement. In this sense, he considers: We live all our lives in a state of epistemic imperfection. Obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Somewhat less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond in the best way to the evidence we have Feldman R (p. 187) [52].

For this author, disagreement is evidence that we are fallible. Our epistemic condition assumes that we give imperfect answers to incomplete evidence, that is, it is part of the rational agent to take into account these sources of imperfection.

From the perspective of moderate conciliationism, a chemist can hold a conciliationist position, in the sense of considering the objections of the epistemic peer and submitting one’s own beliefs to review, without necessarily having to suspend judgment or adopt the opponent’s position. But what would come into play in the evaluation of the adjustment of the degree of confidence in the belief? For this philosophical perspective, we have: 1 - The confidence that the agent has in the relationship between the evidence and his belief (second order evidence); 2 - The authority he grants to his epistemic peer; 3 - The degree of explanatory and/or practical success of his theory in the community of epistemic peers.

In general, conciliationism, in its strongest conception, the so-called Equal Weight View, considers that we should give equal weight to the opinions of epistemic agents in a rational epistemic disagreement [70]. The point here is that we should give equal weight to the beliefs of epistemic peers. Roughly speaking, this means that we should review the status of the beliefs we form and consider the other’s opinion in the disagreement debate, since both of us as epistemic pairs have a 50% chance of being right about the issue under investigation. That is, according to the previous example, agent X who comes to the conclusion that B, can be as right as agent Y who comes to the conclusion that ~B. If both opinions have equal weight, as indicated by the Equal Weight View, then it is believed that we have no reason to hold either one of them, and in that case we should suspend judgment as in all cases of disagreement between epistemic pairs. This attitude seems unreasonable and could reverberate as a kind of epistemic cowardice as Christensen D [70].

Another problem concerns the gradual loss of self- confidence. If both opinions also have equal weight, then we are in a sense reducing or even weakening the self-confidence we have regarding our own justification. The point here, for example, is that agent X has transparent and privileged access to the formation and justification of his belief, which he does not have relative to agent Y who comes to the conclusion that ~B. Other views are adopted to avoid the objections of this perspective, for example, the Extra Weight View. According to this view, “we should give our own evaluation more weight than the evaluation of those we count as epistemic peers” (p. 485) [70]. However, what we observe is that both Christensen D [70] and Feldman R [52, 71, 72], hold that the problem of peer disagreement affects justification of agents’ beliefs in the dispute.

If on the one hand, the most rational position in disagreements between epistemic pairs is to take the conciliationist view as we have seen in Christensen D [70, 71] and Feldman R [52, 71, 72]. On the other hand, the most rational position is believed to be the anticonciliationist view [35, 38, 74]. The anticonciliationist says that in the face of a peer disagreement, we should not revise or downgrade confidence in the justification of our original belief, the disagreement itself does not interfere with the justification of the belief, and conciliating would harm both radical skepticism and loss of confidence [35, 38, 74].

Let’s take the initial example from another perspective. If agent Y has properly evaluated the same evidence, arguments, and information relevant to forming his belief that ~B, knowing that agent X has reached an opposite conclusion does not require agent Y to make any revision to his belief. That is, upon discovering that agent X disagrees with agent Y, it would not affect agent Y’s rationality to continue believing what he believed. For Lombardi O and Labarca M [39]: Rationality consists in responding appropriately to our evidence. But our evidence includes evidence according to which we do not always respond appropriately to our evidence (that is, evidence according to which we are fallible in responding appropriately to our evidence), as well as evidence according to which we are more likely to respond inappropriately when we find ourselves in certain circumstances. (p. 139) [39].

On this basis, Lombardi O, Labarca M [39] adds that an evidence can confirm or deny, in some way, the rationality of what we believe based on the evidence we have. Regarding the question of properly evaluating the evidence with respect to a given issue, Kelly T [38] comments that this consideration is certainly the kind of consideration that is relevant in deciding whether the agent’s judgment should be credited with respect to the issue. That is, it is exactly the kind of consideration that is capable of producing asymmetry that would justify privileging one of the two parties in the dispute over the other [38].

Within this context, the attitude that seems to be the most appropriate, reasonable and rational in case of disagreement, is to hold firm to the initial belief. This means that the agent should not reduce the degree of confidence of his belief nor of his justification. Adding to this, knowing that an agent (an epistemic peer) disagrees with our belief that P (e.g., the concept of molecular structure is reducible to quantum theory for specific reasons), does not require us to make any revisions in our belief either. That is, we must always hold firm to our belief both from the first person perspective and in front of a disagreeing peer. In this sense, the author states that: Disagreement is not a good reason for skepticism or for changing the original view. In what follows, I will argue for the following thesis: once I have fully scrutinized the available evidence and arguments supporting a question, the mere fact that an epistemic peer radically disagrees with me about how that question should be answered does not weaken my rationality to continue believing it the way I do. Even if I confidently retain my original view in the face of that disagreement, doing so does not constitute a failure of rationality. In fact, confidently retaining the original belief may be the only reasonable response in such circumstances (p. 170) [38].

The point is that for this author, the justification of a given belief is based on first-order evidence (information or reasons). The discovery of a disagreement, on the other hand, would be second-order evidence, and therefore would not affect the justification of that belief at all. In the context of disagreement, what Kelly does is to give priority to first-order reasons over second-order reasons. For him, even if we admit disagreement as a second-order evidence capable of changing the justification of epistemic agents, it would still not be a good reason to change the starting belief. So, in case of disagreement, even after the discovery of an epistemic pair, it is rational to hold firm the same degree of confidence in the starting belief. If agent Y has properly evaluated the arguments, the information, the evidence, and is justified in holding the belief that ~B, then he has no reason to reconcile his belief with his opponent. It would not be unreasonable for agent Y to continue to believe that ~B, the disagreement itself is not a good reason to reduce the degree of confidence in the starting belief. Another point of the discussion concerns self-confidence. If on the one hand, in the conciliationist view, there is gradual loss of self-confidence; in the anticonciliationist view, the first- person perspective is non-eliminable [68]. We have access to the process of forming our beliefs, but we do not have it in relation to our opponent. In a way, this could give us greater confidence in the belief we form and would be a reason to hold firm to our belief.

Reflection and Disagreements

There is an intense debate in contemporary epistemology about the place of reflection. Some say that it has less value than is thought; others that it has great epistemic value; still others that it has only moral value. For [44], the most common argument that defends the idea that reflection has no epistemic value considers that, through reflection, the formation of second-order beliefs does not affect the attribution of knowledge or improve its reliability. Like these authors, I will remain neutral on this argument.

On this basis, when dealing with non-dialectical contexts, I think it is reasonable to consider that it becomes irrelevant for a person to reflect on a given situation. In contrast, there are relevant cases in which reflection is indispensable, and, moreover, should result in something of great epistemic value. On this point, I agree with (p. 14) [75] when he considers that “a person can discover directly, by reflection, what he is justified in believing at the moment.” Such is the case with the disagreement.

About the relevance of reflection, a strong debate about this notion has been outlined in two well-defined positions: the one initiated by Kelly T [28], which considers that reflection would be the act of thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing that allows access to the idea that could not be obtained directly from things via empirical experience. From another point of view, reflection is understood as a metacognitive performance so that the subject evaluates its own first-order doxastic states (for example, its beliefs and thoughts), and leads to new second-order doxastic states [76]. In this sense, the subject is enabled to judge his own states and act in light of his judgment.

In this section, then, I admit that when a subject reflects he can focus on his cognitive states, so that he can believe something based on reasons or even assume beliefs that are good reasons about the natural world. Some of the main questions considered within this context are: can we produce a discourse that justifies our beliefs? Do we have the intellectual ability to list reasons that can justify our beliefs? Do we have the means to produce a justification that assures us that our beliefs are true? Can our beliefs be justified through reflection? I understand reflection as a performance in which the subject examines evidence, reasons, counter- arguments, positions and contents. In beliefs, believing here refers not only to the belief of something, but to the legitimate right of the subject to believe in something he has reasons to believe, even if reflection is understood as a partial, fragile and imperfect human capacity. In the face of disagreements, a critical subject that seeks to discuss the reasons, submitting them to the sieve of reason (that is, the arguments for or against), is a virtuous subject and has epistemic value.

Autonomy, Anticonciliationism and Science Teaching

Around the molecular structure problem, I argue that the notion of epistemic disagreement [14, 44, 54] can be incorporated into this problem. In my understanding, it seems clear that there is an epistemic disagreement regarding the molecular structure problem since we find epistemic pairs with distinct beliefs facing the same evidence. Moreover, I argue that this problem has a broader scope when we go beyond the special case of epistemic pairs.

I maintain that the discussion surrounding the molecular structure problem involves two major groups: (1) The reductionists and (2) The non-reductionists. Thus, based on the reasons that were deemed relevant to the dispute, table 1 is proposed:

Group 1: The reductionists Group 2: The non-reductionists (1) Physicalism: physics as self-sufficient [100]. (1) There is no physically well-founded, non-trivial example for theory reduction in Nagel’s sense, and even if there were the reduction would fail [40, 84].

(2) Reductionism within a reduction of principles [101]. (2) Properties of a chemical system cannot be explained by physical micro-components [87].

(3) Dependence between macro and micro processes [102] (3) The Born-Oppenheimer approach is insufficient to think about the problem of structure [37].

(4) Local and partial reductions [34] 94) Impossibility of epistemological reduction [41, 87]

(5) The molecular structure can be obtained based on the topological properties of the electron density distribution function of the system [32].

(6) The hope for future reduction [31] (6) The equations of state used to estimate the energy of interactions of molecules cannot be deduced from any fundamental theory [41]

(7) The environment brings out the classicality of the chemical structure, e.g. decoherence, etc. (7) The Schrödinger equation cannot be solved analytically without the use of approximations and models [79, 103, 104].

(8) The reconstruction of the concept of molecular structure within the framework of the quantum theory of atoms in molecule [32]. (8) Molecular structure as an emergent phenomenon.

(5) Chemical concepts cannot be derived from the concepts and laws of physics [41]

(9) “Giving up entirely on the hope of reduction at this stage therefore means giving up entirely on hope” (p. 5) [34]. (9) Ontological Pluralism [40, 41, 43, 105].

Considering the beliefs publicly expressed by the members of each group around the problem of molecular structure, and that they possess, strictly speaking, approximately the same intellectual abilities (reflection, reasoning, responsibility, confidence, and intellectual virtues), it seems clear that, in the face of the same evidence (arguments, reasons, and information that the agents claim) there are disagreements between the authors who support the reductionist and non-reductionist positions. Faced with this dispute, what is the most rational attitude the agent should take in the face of this disagreement? (a) Continue to believe what he believed. (b) Decrease confidence in one’s starting belief. (c) Suspend judgment.

When I consider in this paper that the agent must have an “attitude” in disagreement, I am thinking of it within the theoretical perspective defended by Goldman A [4]. The philosopher, when commenting on the attitude in disagreements, uses the term gradation: for him, it is possible for the agent to believe with moderation, with firmness, or with absolute conviction, and so on. In a sense, what Alvin Goldman does with respect to Richard Feldman’s perspective is to extend it: attitude disagreement includes opinion disagreement. I maintain that the most rational, responsible, and reasonable action in the face of such disagreement is to be uncompromising: it is to continue to believe and hold firm to the same belief that the concept of molecular structure is not reducible to quantum theory. That is, if I adequately assess the disagreement, as well as the arguments, the information, the evidence, and am justified in holding the belief, then I have no reason to reconcile, alter the degree of confidence of the belief or the justification with an opponent.

In this perspective, being justified implies that I have reasons to believe. When I talk about reason or reasons in this thesis, my view is close to the perspective advocated by Grimm S [93]: almost always I am dealing with a capacity or an ability of the epistemic agent to evaluate, judge, consider, ponder, critique its own reasons in the face of epistemic disagreement around the molecular structure, and somehow conduct itself in light of these evaluations, considerations, ponderings and critiques, thus achieving a more flexible, thoughtful and reasonable intellectual attitude.

From this, I think that the correct thesis for the disputation is the anticonciliationist one, because I see that it is the most rational action, presupposes intellectual autonomy, virtues, and does not advocate intellectually vicious positions. I maintain that the thesis is justified for specific reasons: (1) The properties of a chemical system cannot be explained by physical microcomponents [87]; (2) The Born-Oppenheimer approach is insufficient to think the problem of structure [37]; (3) Impossibility of epistemological reduction [41, 87]; (4) Chemical concepts cannot be derived from the concepts and laws of physics [41]; (5) The equations of state used to estimate the energy of interactions of molecules cannot be deduced from any fundamental theory [41]; (6) The Schrödinger equation cannot be solved analytically without the use of approximations and models [79, 103, 104]; (7) Molecular structure as an emergent phenomenon that, although irreducible to quantum mechanics, depends ontologically on the underlying quantum domain. Furthermore, I argue, as does [106], that chemical explanations and models are part of the specificity of the chemical level, and therefore autonomous from other sciences, in particular Physics. Chemistry is distinctly an autonomous science, especially in terms of epistemological and ontological aspects.

How would disagreement, however, affect science teaching? If a teacher presents a disagreement in the classroom, does his/her position (of being conciliationist or anticonciliationist) make a difference? Considering the ontological pluralist perspective, that is, that there is no privileged description between classical molecular chemistry and quantum theory for the concept of molecular structure, and that both ontic realms can coexist to the extent that each of them is constituted by corresponding conceptual schemes, I maintain that the theoretical gain for science teaching would be to show students - from university education - that we have two different images of science to deal with the same problem. The choice between such descriptions will depend on the factors relevant to each situation or on the interest that drives the teacher in each particular case.

I propose that teachers should help students understand the exuberance of plurality of viewpoints of scientific explanations, not as confusion, but to help them penetrate the complexity of the problem context. That is, the same concept (molecular structure) can have both a physical description and a chemical description, even if they are far apart. However, neither description should be privileged over the other [43]. For Van Brakel J [42], if there is no privileged description, both chemical and quantum mechanical concepts are “powerful and illuminating metaphors”. In dialogue with this author, I think we should also be tolerant enough to leave the same ontological space for both descriptions. This argument suggests that chemical entities, properties and relations such as molecule, orbital, molecular structure or chemical bonding - need not refer to any item of physics to acquire ontological legitimacy [40, 41, 96, 107], that is, its objective existence is independent of its reduction or emergence with respect to supposedly more basic entities, properties, and relations, but the fact that it is described by a discipline such as chemistry, whose predictive success and transformative capacity no one would currently doubt. Within a pluralist realism, such items exist independently in every ontology constituted as such.

I believe, that all these are good reasons to hold firm the belief of non-reduction for the dispute. Finally, I believe that the concept of molecular structure serves well to think about the coexistence of two different scientific explanations, regardless of their incompatibility for the same phenomenon.

Conclusion and Future Perspectives

This paper addressed the topic: “The purpose of teaching Science” in the light of an epistemological approach. Given the context, in which different theses are defended, I argued in favor of the thesis, considering that one of the objectives of science teaching is the formation of a critical citizen with intellectual autonomy. To illustrate a central theme of Chemistry teaching, the disagreement about the concept of molecular structure was used as an example. I argued that in order to be able to participate in an epistemic disagreement, we must be intellectually and morally prepared for the debate, in order to avoid a rash attitude. This attitude implies that we must carefully and thoroughly evaluate the assertions (thought actions), reasons, and objections surrounding the reducibility or otherwise of molecular structure to quantum theory.

As can be seen, the origin of the disagreement about the interpretation of the concept of molecular structure is formed at the emergence of quantum mechanics in the field of chemistry. More specifically, when we discuss the links between molecular chemistry and quantum theory. According to classical molecular chemistry, molecules have a structure, that is, they are sets of atoms with defined arrangements in space and held together by chemical bonds. However, such a concept seems to find no place in the ontology described by quantum mechanics, since it appeals to classical notions such as the position of atomic nuclei, both of which are strongly challenged in the quantum context.

In science teaching, especially in chemistry teaching, a central aspect, defended here, was to consider that students should learn not only about the current debate, but also, and especially, something about the nature of science. I argued that the autonomous student has the character of evaluative judgment; what determines the act in science/chemistry teaching should be their choice, not the belief we should impose on the intellect as is usually the case in science/ chemistry teaching today. I believe that in teaching chemistry, the presentation and discussion of the problem of molecular structure can lead university students to understand the nature of the relationship between chemistry and physics, as well as the discussion around reduction. I believe that this would already be a great gain for science teaching: to recognize that around the idea of molecular structure there are two distinct scientific images in front of the debate.

In general, this dispute could lead science education in more fruitful directions. For university teaching, the understanding around the relationship between chemistry and physics would point to the need for knowledge of an earlier discussion: the question of neglect - why one of the most productive sciences of the 20th century was neglected. This examination points to the primacy achieved by physics in the philosophy of science. A relevant point, because we could reflect together with the students on reasons that culminated in the historical neglect of the philosophy of chemistry in the philosophy of science. I believe that the approach between Philosophy of Chemistry and Chemistry Education could bring benefits. Among them, how reflections about the nature of the chemical thinking style can contribute to conceptual- theoretical learning. Moreover, such a relationship can help teachers in training and teacher trainers in understanding and clarifying basic problems of chemical education linked to the ontological and epistemological dimensions.

Another point to consider is that in teacher education, the relationship between philosophy and teaching could develop a deeper epistemological conception of chemistry. A major contribution to university teaching would be the need for greater inclusion of the philosophies of chemistry and science within the training of chemistry teachers. The possibility of analyzing the problem from a historical perspective of the proposed models would be welcome for science teaching. And, in this sense, to present models, their uses, applications, explanatory difficulties and limitations, and to highlight that each one of them has its importance in the historical context.

In short, I maintained that the result of such philosophical work is not truth or a theory (hence, a model) regarding the problem investigated, but something like autonomy. Such an attitude implies that the agent can examine the problem, be more careful, more disciplined, less arrogant, more attentive to arguments, objections, counter-examples, be open- minded, and so on. In my view, a virtuous agent should not be entitled to take an argument only without considering the contrary. In this sense, it is argued that approaching autonomy as an intellectual virtue aligns with critical- reflective thinking, both of which are fundamental if we are to cultivate the rationality of agents.

It is relevant to point out, a subject who examines his own beliefs, his reasons, does not mean that, in the end, his effort will be successful, or that there will be clarity about what is being investigated or that the reasons will become evident. While I recognize that things may, in the end, remain unclear, I think that reflecting critically on one’s own beliefs, regardless of the outcome, is something positive and valuable for science teaching, for scientific practice, and for teacher education.

Criticality refers to the virtuous agent, his valuable attitude of belief in the face of disagreement: a more demanding attitude, suspicious of given statements, becoming able to understand the reasons and the distinct positions around the problem. Such an attitude consisted in holding firm to the starting belief regarding the question: molecular structure - reducible or non-reducible to quantum theory? Therefore, we can have: the belief that [molecular structure is not reducible to quantum theory for specific reasons], or the thought that [quantum theory does not explain the problem of molecular structure]. So one can speak of the semantic content or meaning of the agent’s belief, thought, and so on. As point out, when we believe, we almost always believe something or think something. In terms of beliefs, believing refers not only to the belief of something, but the legitimate right of the agent to believe what he has reason to believe[108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114].

Therefore, this work is a rational effort that sought to defend approaches that were considered relevant between Social Epistemology and Science/Chemistry Teaching, in order to defend a precious goal: the formation of an epistemic agent with intellectual autonomy. Finally, it sought to argue that such approaches can also help students and teachers to distinguish in a careful, disciplined and moderate way between knowing, understanding, believing and the attitude of belief that one can take in something related to science.

To this end, we explored a case of epistemic justification in which the agent can reach conclusions not only on his own. It also sought to think about a possible way of adopting beliefs in science teaching. Supported by social epistemology, I argued that the belief of one agent can somehow interfere directly or indirectly with the belief of another. I believe that this work has contributed to other fronts of investigation: How are intellectual virtues actually born? When do we start or become virtuous agents? What would be the causes involved? Is it possible to always be virtuous or not? What

makes a virtue different from a value? What pathways can be used for epistemic agents to become virtuous? What other problems are relevant for teacher education in science/ chemistry? For the last question, it is worth investigating an agenda of problems: the concept of the atomic orbital, chemical bonding, chirality, the foundations of the periodic table; models and explanations in chemistry and their links to chemical education, and so on. Keeping myself open to dialogue with people who are interested in understanding the nature of the problem agreed upon here, that is, how it is formed within the community, how it is solved (if there is a solution at all), how to act in the face of debate, how to carefully examine the positions around it, is an attitude that can lead to epistemic and moral gains.

I end the article by highlighting that the problems investigated are objects of discussions that have occurred in recent years in ongoing debates in the analyzed fields. However, the objective of this work was not to offer a definitive solution to any of the debates, but to propose a line of argument for the problems investigated, which I believe, supported by the theoretical references, to be a fruitful path for the teaching of science and, in particular, for the teaching of chemistry.

Acknowledgments

To the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), for the scholarship granted, support and financial aid so that I could fully dedicate myself to the research. To my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Waldomiro José da Silva Filho, thanks for all the affection, attention and for the rich and luxurious contributions, not only in the orientation of this work, but throughout my trajectory in the Graduate Program in Teaching, Philosophy and History of Science, Federal University of Bahia/ State University of Feira of Santana.