On the Problem of the Ontology of a Literary Work on the Ontological Dimension of a Work of Art

Conceptual Paper

Frege, et al. in his famous article [1], amply argued that truth of a sentence is its true meaning (reference), he simultaneously de-emphasized all sentences in fiction. This view, one way or another, was picked up and strengthened by representatives of analytical philosophy, and the function of any fiction has lost its descriptive, and with it the cognitive component, and was attributed by them exclusively to a certain psychological sphere, that is, morality, education, entertainment, etc. Thus, the ontological dimension of a Conceptual Paper literary work remained limited only to the sphere of things, that is, the material carriers of the work, in other words, paper, printing ink, etc.

The problem of the ontological dimension of a work of art (far from being only a literary one) had already passed a rather long and difficult path by the time the mentioned article by the German mathematician and logician was published in 1892. The main battles of that time unfolded in search of the relationship between the material and ideal spheres in a work of art. The question as a whole was considered in two aspects from Kant to Fechner: is art a form of reflection of this world (i.e. a form of knowledge), or is it a penetration into the higher world (a form of idealization). The orientation of the ontological component was determined depending on the answer (it is clear that there were no absolute positions here, only a certain advantage): in the first case, the emphasis was on the design of the material components of the work, in the second-on other aspects, both compositional and means of psychological influence on reader (listener, viewer, etc.). The basis of these battles was the identification of aesthetics as a special sphere by Baumgarten and the autonomy of the sphere of art proclaimed by Kant. According to Kant, the basis of a work of art was the unison of the beautiful nature and the subject’s psychological world, in this the German philosopher followed Rousseau to a certain extent, and his opinion was picked up and developed by the romantics and Schelling. This approach was based on the theological idea of the creation of the world, which was reflected in the order of nature. Schiller countered this approach with the view that art is an idealizing force opposed to nature. Hegel, in his grandiose aesthetics, tried to combine both views, by proclaiming a work of art as an Absolute Idea (Absolute Spirit) in the form of the otherness of spirit (matter). But for him, the idea remained in the first place as true, because it alone is reasonable, or a concept. Any beauty of this world can only be a means of manifestation and depiction of ideas, truths. Nature as the otherness of the spirit can be beautiful only as an imperfect form of expression of the absolute spirit; therefore, the main thing in Hegel’s understanding of creativity was the conflict and tension between the infinite and the finite. A work of art is such an objectification of the spirit, which has not yet reached its highest form, in which the concept has not yet received a higher understanding of itself. It is clear that with this approach, the real ontology remains on the side of the spirit, the idea, and the material side is always a limitation, it is a subjective spirit, a spirit accessible by the feeling of the one who perceives it, the subject. But in general, Hegel’s aesthetics continued the line of Kant, giving art exceptional importance as one of the main forms in which a person is able to perceive the highest truth.

Therefore, it is not surprising that many philosophers of the second half of the 19th century plunged with particular passion into the search for how material means can include something higher than themselves, how a writer or painter, sculptor or musician is able to put something infinite into a finite form, to talk as much as possible about something impossible as a real thing. Philosophers and art historians of the late 19th century had found many techniques and methods for using seemingly familiar materials - language, colors, musical sounds, etc., therefore they felt a certain temptation to limit art to a certain set of techniques. And the concept of l’art pour l’art arose as evidence of the mastery of power, as a manifestation of a new ability. But behind the temptation, as always, the time for redemption has come. (By the way, this problem will become one of the leading ones in the criticism of liberal theology by dialectical theology from the beginning of the 20s of the last century).

Questions of the ontology of art, its place in the world and its role in cognition did not bother Frege G, et al. at all, as far as this can be understood from his texts, but the attention of the German mathematician and logician was focused on the attainment of true knowledge, a task for which it seemed to him that the best way to solve it was mathematical knowledge, which receives its justification through logic. Art was seen as hostile to logic, so Frege, unknowingly (which is most likely), rejected art as incapable of finding the truth, much less substantiate what was found. And this in a certain way coincided with the role of art in the 20th century: on the one hand, it was denied participation in scientific knowledge, which alone was considered true, on the other hand, it (possibly, together with theology) was seen as the only way to express the truth of the new world, which was losing all logical foundations and even outlines before the eyes of contemporaries (and the First World War became a confirmation of this, and the Second only approved it).

The beginning of the 20th century strengthened the tradition of considering art as a material thing, which, due to its form, again had to testify to something else (as a symbol, allegory, etc.). Since this evidence was made possible precisely because of certain formalization techniques, it is not surprising that they became the subject of careful attention and study. This view was shared by representatives of different philosophical trends - neo-Kantians, formalists, as N. Hartman and some of his colleagues saw the structure of a work of art. The starting point for this point of view was the premise that a thing is something that is perceived by the senses (given by the sense), and the value and meaning arise as subjective due to the “reading” of the thought put in by the author.

Heidegger, et al. repelled from this point of view in a later period (it is no coincidence that his Der Utsprung des Kunstwerkes (1935/36) [2]. Begins with the subdivision Das Ding und das Werk), but through consideration of options for a possible understanding of a thing, he demonstrates the inconsistency of such an approach, as well as the inexpediency of using the opposition of concepts form and substance. Heidegger develops and gradually substantiates the thesis that art reveals the truth of being, but on the basis of creation, and not a material basis. Here there is no opportunity to delve into Heidegger’s analysis of artistic creation (Kunstwerk), I will only note that Heidegger sees the possibility of understanding it precisely at the level of ontology, therefore creation includes the whole world (Welt), it is the disclosure of the world through the nature of artistic creation, i.e. e. dispute, tension between the world and the earth. The question of the extent to which Heidegger reproduces the Hegelian dialectic of the infinite and the finite in revealing this “tension”, “argument”, “blow”, we leave aside here, more important for us is that in a work of art it is not the truth of the idea-concept (as was the case with Hegel) that finds itself, but a breakthrough to being itself, or rather its accomplishment.

Heidegger, et al. emphasizes the importance of the presence in a work of art not only of disclosure, but also of concealment, otherwise complete disclosure would turn into a holistic objectification, turning everything into a surface. And we meet such a view of the state of the world in postmodernity (poststructuralism)-in G. Deleuze, J.-F. Lyotard, etc. The world becomes objective, loses depth, in the place of which we now find only a fold of the surface.

The question of the ontology of a work of art (in our case, we restrict ourselves to a work of literature) remains open. The previous review, condensed to a schematic level, is intended to demonstrate that the solution of the question of the ontology of a work of art depends on what role is assigned to art in the human cognition, and this ontology is determined precisely through the ability to justify this role (this, of course, does not apply to Kant). But this conclusion should not be regarded as critical: such a methodology can be considered justified, because in any case we are forced to accept something as an axiom, from which it is necessary to start. Another methodology will only rely on other axioms, Huserl’s attempts to find an “unconditional beginning” retains the status of only a project.

Nevertheless, we will try to determine the way in which, in our opinion, the ontology of a literary work should be sought through the work itself. We will begin with what is given directly in sensory perception. Each literary work, when it appears before us, certainly has a material side-it is a voice, paper, parchment, silk, wood, stone, metal, the screen of an electronic device, etc. We will take this step following Heidegger, and together with him we will refuse to see in this aspect the ontology of a work. Of course, any medium of text has an ontological side in this sense, but this is ontology of a thing, not a work, and the telephone directory is no different in this sense from the best of novels. This is a necessary level, but since one material can easily be changed to another, we can safely leave it aside.

The next level is language or text, they can be considered here as synonyms, since they are characterized through the relationship between elements those themselves do not yet constitute them. Another reason for combining them in this case is the fact that they are present in any literary work, but do not determine the specific features of the work of art, so they should also be bypassed. This level is necessary for all acts of communication, oral and written, so it makes no sense to consider it as a key one in our search.

Further, the situation becomes more complicated, because the last level common to all literary works is the narrative level, and then there is a distribution according to the types of literature, genres, etc. The narrative level has its own specific structural features and principles of organization (or institutional connections), but they differ significantly depending on whether we are considering one or another genre (lyric poetry or novel), as well as cultural divisions within the genre, for example, whether we are talking about ancient Chinese poetry or European medieval, especially modern English poetry. Therefore, we will start with a specific example - and then try to test our conclusions on the literature of other times, cultures and genres.

As an example, we will choose the genre of the short story, as it is widespread and relatively well known (in addition, from the point of view that interests us, it is close to some other genres, such as a story, a novel, an feature article, an essay, etc.). Take, for example, the short story by Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky the Witch (1898). Here we have a small number of characters who are connected by certain relationships that serve as the basis (partially they are described, partly implied), new ones are superimposed on them, and this superposition constitutes the plot of the story. The vast majority of stories–even consisting of a description – have a plot, and this plot is the disclosure of relationships between objects (characters, things, phenomena, etc.). The plot of the story is relatively simple: a young girl is unreasonably accused of witchcraft, and at the same time the main characters show their main character traits. The characters in Kotsyubynsky’s story are the girl Paraskitsa, her father Jon, her stepmother Maritsa, aunt Prohira, Prohira’s husband Yoch Galchan, and others. In the story, as in most works of this genre, new relationships are superimposed on the original, basic relationships through a certain event, new relationships are designed to clarify and deepen the reader’s understanding of stable basic relationships and the characters themselves.

In other words, we have a complex intersection or interlacing of relationships between objects (in our example, relationships between members of the Broskov family and their relations with neighbors), leading to a clarification of the nature of these objects (Paraskitsa, Jon, Maritsa, etc.). Of course, you can find a story in which this is not so obvious, but even in the more complex stories of Kafka, Kharms or Borges; this scheme is preserved, although sometimes the author removes some components that the reader must assume. In The Witch, the basis is the stable traditional life of the rural community and the Broskov family, where the stepmother does not love the stepdaughter, and the weak father is unable to find it out or counter anything against this hostility. Along with this, all family members without exception feel a strong dependence on the opinions and attitudes of community members, which is characterized by certain prejudices and fantastic (including religious) ideas. New circumstances are superimposed on this permanent basis: first, a hidden suspicion of Paraskitsa’s witchcraft on the part of aunt Prohira, and then a direct accusation by the peasants of Ion’s daughter as a witch (strigoyka). Some characters (Maritsa, аunt Prohira, Yoch Galichan) use this rather difficult situation to solve purely personal interests and goals. Each of the characters acting in the story, not excluding Paraskica herself, is dependent on the views of society and has a tendency to accept the view of the majority, despite the facts or arguments of reason. The two tests that the girl has to go through are based on personal ambition, fantastic imaginations, and include public discussion.

Everything that has been said above about the structure of the story is a fairly well-known fact, and can, as a scheme, be attributed to a significant number of works of this genre. Let us return to the question of ontology. No matter how real this work would not seem, with whatever degree of accuracy it describes the real state of affairs, even if it arose under the influence of real events that happened in a particular village, for example, known to the author from his experience in government service in Bessarabia as part of the Odessa Philoxera Commission, all the events and all the characters of all works of art without exception are formed, fictional. Even if we find documentary evidence that in the Bessarabian village X the Broskov family really lived, the head of which was called Jon, that he has a daughter Paraskitsa from his first marriage, and second wife Maritsa, and we also will receive confirmation of the existence of other characters of the story and documents regarding the case of Paraskitsa Broska’s accusation in witchcraft, all this by no means can be a justification for the fact that the story of M. Kotsiubinsky accurately describes a real event. The ontology of a real event does not affect the ontology of a work of art in any way and is not transmitted to it in any way. The real existence of Achilles or Hector has nothing to do with the ontology of the Iliad. This is also a well-known fact. Any image always remains an image and only. Its “realism”, “similarity”, “plausibility” or “recognizability” does not affect the ontological dimension of the work of art itself, but can be attributed solely to the reader’s emotional perception. And this last fact is worth noting.

If the ontology of an image cannot be measured either by the material with which it is built, or by its resemblance to the external world, then what else remains in it, on what can it is based? We noted the presence in the work of some objects and relations between them. Are there constructive rules for these relationships? It should be recognized that such rules exist. Moreover, these rules belong to two different spheres. Firstly, they somehow refer to general ideas about the external world or a special sphere of reality, which is common to reality and its description (close to what L. Wittgenstein called “logical form”); conventionally, we will designate it as real-logical sphere. Secondly, these are the rules of the sphere of narrative, that is, the “logic of narration.” This area needs some clarification.

When Abell, et al. describes the narrative as “a time- ordered a-cyclic multi-arc di-graph where the nodes (vertices) depict states of the world and the arcs the actions which transform these states” [3], he speaks of the smallest particle of the narrative, so to speak, of its “unit”. By doing this, he means that the narrative corresponds to some action in reality, that is, is its description, which allows him to propose a method of probabilistic causal inference, which he calls the method of Bayesian narrativesn [4]. Such a narrative rather belongs to the first sphere, which we have designated as real-logical one. What we have in mind can rather be called the “grammar” of the narrative, when what has been said before (we denote it by α) narrows the circle of what can be said further (that is, β, γ, δ are possible, but not κ, λ, μ). So, if someone says “firstly”, then we expect him to say “secondly”, and not suddenly immediately “fourthly” or even to talk about something else. But in a fictional narrative, this is possible, the one who speaks, as it were, moves from the level of describing reality to the level of the narrative itself. Violation of the rules of the second sphere or playing with them is especially noticeable in cases of certain joke stories, riddles, tedious fairy tales, etc. In a tale “Three wise men of Gotham, They went to sea in a bowl, And if the bowl had been stronger, My song would have been longer.” The story itself, the narrator and the listener become an integral part of the plot, the signifier becomes the signified, in other words, the process of narration interferes with the level of the image. Such a shift in plans is also possible in graphics, a good example of which can be some engravings by M.K. Escher (Reptiles, Drawing hands, Ascending and descending, Waterfall). Authors can make the presence of such interference of one level in another only due to the fact that the coexistence of these levels is inherent in any image.

Thus, we have in a literary work a certain number of artificial objects (characters, objects, facts) and a two- level system of connections between them - real-logical and narrative. This allows us to consider literary creativity as modeling, and the literary work itself as a model of the world or its artificially selected part. In this form, it is more like mathematics, where models of the relationship between artificially created entities (numbers or variables) are also created. Nicolas Bourbaki gives the following definition: the essence of mathematics is the doctrine “the study of relationships between objects that are only (voluntarily) known and described by some of their properties, precisely those that are put as axioms at the foundations of their theory” [5].

The movement to reform the new teaching of mathematics in Germany, begun in the second half of the 19th century under the slogan of “functional thinking”, led by Felix Klein and which eventually led to the creation of a “mathematical paradise” at the University of Göttingen, was largely based on the idea of its leaders that the main thing that should be taught to the future mathematician is the habit of thinking in terms of variables and functions [6]. A function in this sense meant a description of the dependence of one variable y on another x, or a reflection of one set (a set of x values) onto another or the same set. Thus, the mathematical procedure assumed: 1) the presence of variables whose value belongs to a certain area; 2) the presentation of these variables with the help of signs; 3) the presence of functions or mappings of the range of values of one variable onto the range of values of another. Of course, in a literary work this is not exactly the case, but you should look at it more carefully. If we take the characters of the The Witch as variables, we will see that the story is constructed as the intersection of many functions at the same time: it begins with how the actions (representations, words, story) of aunt Prohira (let’s denote her as b) are reflected in other variables (Ion Broschi (c) and his wife Marizzi (d)), then their actions (words, behavior, views) are reflected in the state of Paraskica (a), a little later we get a story about the reflection of the actions of other peasants (e1, e2, e3...) to Paraskitsa. It is easy to conclude that the behavior of the peasants (the value of the variables) is also a reflection of the story of the same Prohira (b), and we can, in turn, denote this story (gossip spread by her) as x. So are the subsequent events of the narrative, the main of which is the mapping of the values of the variables b, c, d, e1, e2, e3... to the value (state) a. At the same time, these variables themselves become the result of the influence of the variable x on them. That is, the story is built as a system of relations between a and b, хc, хd, хe1, хe2, хe3... The story itself is structured in such a way that the variable x and the function given by it reveal the true value of all other variables and the entire set as a whole.

The main question is the legitimacy of comparing or identifying abstract objects of mathematics with objects (for simplicity, we will limit ourselves to characters) of a literary work. Mathematical objects are much idealized, from time to time brought to the utmost simplicity, sometimes idealization is also present in literary works, but still the characters are much more complicated than mathematical units. As for mathematical objects, it was noticed even in ancient times that their ultimate idealization and abstractization made it possible to establish numerous and diverse connections between them, in particular, a hierarchy between them and the selection of those fundamental elementary objects from which all the rest are built (in ancient mathematics - numbers and geometric shapes, in modern - mainly sets). The situation with literary objects is much more complicated: even the simplest characters (designated in the work only as “man”, “boy”, “girl”, “grandfather”, etc.) are really quite complex, it is not possible to single out elementary objects from them. Although the characters of a literary work seem much more complex than mathematical objects, they are quite amenable to formalization, their difference in gender, race, age, culture, etc. make up a finite and relatively small list (there is no fundamental difference from mathematical objects). It may also seem that the relationships between the characters are much more diverse, but this is also not entirely true: Propp V, et al. showed that the apparent diversity of plots of more than one hundred and fifty fairy tales is reduced to a limited set of thirty-one functions (absentation, interdiction, violation, reconnaissance, delivery, trickery, etc.), while in one fairy tale they never not all are represented. This type of structural analysis is called “syntagmatic”. In it, as a unit of analysis, an event is chosen according to its place in the general predetermined order of narration (“syntagma”). This approach corresponds to the type of narration where one object can easily be changed to another, for example, a person, an animal or some kind of magical entity, such as Baba Yaga, Morozko, devil, mare’s head (donor), can test and reward the stepdaughter, a younger son, or a prince (hero) [7]. The “paradigmatic” analysis, proposed in the structuralism of Levi Strauss C, et al. continues the “syntagmatic” one and at the same time opposes it, as it considers texts (mainly myths) in which the narrative order is not a strict sequence; therefore, Levi Strauss C, et al. singles out repetitions (actions or states) from the text as its main units, and seeks to reveal the main narrative model as a binary oppositional structure (of recurring feature elements, or functions) [8]. Both methods are characterized by the fact that a stable relationship plan takes precedence over a changeable character plan. That is, it can be said that in certain types of literary works, the main creative principle is precisely the system of relations, for which certain objects-characters are then selected to hold and fix it (as in mathematics).

But a modern work of art (story) is distinguished by many details that are unique for it (and for no other), for the works of a given author, for works of a given era and culture. These features exist in the text as inter-penetrating layers. They have become largely the object of post-structuralist analysis: the rhythm of the narrative, the peculiarities of the sound of the text, the alternation of the meanings of the same word depending on the context, the special and changing relationship between the word (denoting) and the object (denoted), the difference in perception of the spoken and written word, the unique features of the author’s language, and much more have become the object use of the entire powerful apparatus of analytical philosophy. Post-structuralists have brought the principles of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language almost to the limit, to the elementary particles of the text. And here the principle discovered by Plato continued to operate: the condition for the knowledge of unique elements is their formalization; in order to be singled out, they must also be reduced to form, and this was possible only through the isolation of their function. Proponents of this approach saw the peculiarity of a work of art precisely in its unique features, but of a different order - from sound to an unspoken, but implied context. The ontology of the text turned out to be pushed to the limit, sometimes to the point of absurdity, and the ontology itself was called into question.

The development of mathematics followed a different scenario, but eventually approached the same state. “Formalists” (D. Hilbert), “intuitionists” (L. E. J. Brouwer) and “logicists” (B. Russell) equally had difficulties in understanding the ontological status of mathematics, despite different ideas about its foundations. The founder and leader of the intuitionist trend, L. E. J. Brouwer, considered mathematics to be convincing rational constructions that had no connection with the question of the existence of their objects [9]. On the other hand, D. Gilbert, like many other mathematicians, “affirm that the mathematical concepts and properties exist in some objective sense and that they can be apprehended by human minds. Thus mathematical truth is discovered not invented. What evolves is not mathematics but man’s knowledge of mathematics” [10]. A significant complication of the volume and quality of mathematical research, as well as the active use of the possibilities of artificial intelligence since the second half of the 20th century, have significantly changed the face of pure mathematics in comparison with its past. In mathematics, social consensus is becoming more and more important, and the trend of its growth is clearly visible for at least the next 50 years. As the English mathematician Davis wrote with concern: “Perhaps by then the differences between mathematics and other disciplines will be so much reduced that philosophical discussions of the unique status of mathematical entities will no longer seem relevant” [11].

This generally sad prediction, however, in our opinion, hides a hint regarding the seemingly insoluble problem of the ontological status of mathematics, and with it also modeling in general, and with it also a literary work. This is a well-known opposition of structuralism in the version of Lévi-Strauss C, et al. and the theory of “the Open Work” by Eco U, et al. if Lévi-Strauss C, et al. believed that a literary text has the Stiffness of a crystal (an example was the analysis of Baudelaire’s “Les Chats” by Jakobson, et al.) [12], then U. Eco defended the opinion that each work of art is completed only in the reader’s interpretation, and before that, it is fundamentally incomplete [13]. A work of art, writes Eco, is a certain communication, and every act of communication, according to Jakobson’s the theory of the functions of language (Jakobson), indispensable provides for such categories as sender, addressee and context [14].

The previous consideration allows us to introduce a certain clarification into the opposition of these views. Levi- Strauss C, et al. is right that a work of art, if it belongs to one author, reflects his intention, and is a complete holistic creation, can be considered as “closed” and completely integrity. But without connecting the addressee, it has no ontological dimension. And Eco U, et al. is right in that he considered the reader (listener, viewer, etc.) as a necessary component of the true existence of the work. Eco, et al. [12] himself denoted some complexity and doubtfulness to see part of the work in the reader’s interpretation. We may add that the term “existence” includes two completely different aspects that must be distinguished: structural integrity (completeness) and incorporation into the world.

Did the Epic of Gilgamesh exist before George Smith informed the scientific community of the discovery of a new epic, “older than the Iliad”, on December 3, 1872? Of course, clay tablets with a record existed; of course, the work had already been completed; only the last one who knew about its existence died more than 2.5 millennia ago. But the existence of clay tablets with the record of Gilgamesh is no different from the existence of similar tablets with a record of the delivered taxes. If we admit that the existence of the work had no interruptions, then it is not known what works still continue to exist today, although not a single person has even heard of them. This epic, only recorded on clay tablets, which should be attributed to at least three different cultures, retained its identity and at the same time changed some features. The same type of existence can be attributed to many mathematical theories (models)–from the laws of Archimedes to the laws of quantum mechanics, from Euclid’s geometry to non-Euclidean geometries. Non-Euclidean geometries have existed for a long time as intellectual fictions that have nothing to do with the real world. Their ontology at that moment was reduced to a logically built sequence of signifiers without a signified. But after one of the non-Euclidean geometries-namely Riemannian geometry- became the key mathematical basis for the development of A. Einstein’s general theory of relativity, it was on it that he based his physical ideas about gravity; the status of this mathematical model has changed significantly [15]. The model itself did not become a reality, it remained only a model, a projection, but now it has become a projection of the real world. Quantum theory also raised doubts for a long time about the possibility of its attribution to the real world, many scientists did not consider it physics at all. But the success in creating atomic weapons immediately turned it into a scientific theory of describing the world of a fundamentally new level of rigor.

It’s time to return to the pending issues and draw conclusions.

We were looking for a way that would allow us to find the ontological dimension of a literary work. The ontology of a literary work lies in its ability to consider its plot and narrative level as models of the real world, that is, as new knowledge about it. At the same time, the “reality” and “plausibility” of the characters or the plot do not affect the quality and completeness of such a model. A work of art is not a breakthrough to eternal truth, but a model of the world order, in many respects similar to a scientific hypothesis (theory). Like any scientific model, a literary work bears the signs of the era of creation, it can become outdated, but it can remain attractive and heuristic. In a certain sense, the history of literature can be viewed through the prism of “paradigms” and “scientific revolutions”, which Kuhn, et al. wrote about [16].

We must admit that the question of the legitimacy of comparing or identifying the abstract objects of mathematics with the objects of a literary work (characters or objects) remains rather complicated. But the development of mathematics in the last century has shown that the nature of mathematical objects is far from being unambiguous and abstract, as it was seen in the 19th century. Nevertheless, the variables of a literary work are even more complex, even further from unambiguity. This is largely due to the use of a name for the hero (but not only). The name in a literary work is by no means a simple designation of a character, it itself carries a lot of cultural connections and meanings, and in some ways is itself a model. Nevertheless, the general principle of a literary work and mathematical theory remains the same - they are a kind of models of reality. Their ontology is ontology of cognition, recognition of the world; it arises and is realized in the activity of the reader (viewer, listener) as the implementation of certain perceived ideas about the world and the last. We need to check our conclusion about the similarity of the work and the model. Take a work from a different era and culture: here is a poem by Li Bo (or Li Bai, 701–762)), the great Chinese poet of the 8th century, Conversation among the Mountains, in a beautiful translation by David Young (we will limit ourselves to translation): You ask why I live in these green mountains. I smile can’t answer I am completely at peace a peach blossom sails past on the current there are worlds beyond this one [17]. Even I, not a very experienced reader of Chinese poetry, can easily identify at least four semantic levels in this poem, and if we take the original text and correlate it with the tradition of Chinese poetry, then their number will increase. Such is the peculiarity of this text as a work of genius, but it is enough for us to remain at the first, literal level, at the level of a mere grammatical form, which is sufficient to define this text as a work.

Representing the elements of this level through variables, we find six of them: me (a), life in the mountains (b), the one who asks (c), a peach blossom (d), river flow (e), indifference to the human world (g), worlds beyond this one (h). Here a is identified successively and gradually with b, d, e, g, h; that is, we have five functions (actually more, because they are also related to each other, for example, d and e). Another function (the sixth) is to resist the misunderstanding of the one who asks (c). But it is precisely this auxiliary-technical function, which in itself has no significance that makes it possible to reveal all the other five functions. Standing apart is z (which, by the way, can also be identified with the reader), whose function is the sum of all five previous functions, more precisely, their sequential summation, which unfolds as an answer (function z). Li Bo amazingly creates a complex structure of functions in a few words, already at the first, most simple, literal level, where they create each other, reinforce, oppose, that is, they act as a single system. Is there really a need to write it down as a formula?.