Is the Lottery Paradox Psychologically Realistic?

Johansson T

doi:10.23880/phij-16000124

Philosophy International Journal Research Article 2 min read

Is the Lottery Paradox Psychologically Realistic?

Johansson T^*

^* Corresponding author

ISSN: 2641-9130 10.23880/phij-16000124 Received: August 12, 2019 Published: August 28, 2019

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Abstract

The lottery paradox is treated as a serious epistemological problem. Philosophers try to solve it by modifying their concepts of rationality. I argue that this is unnecessary. The paradox never occurs in reality, since a crucial assumption -- that people accept that certain lottery tickets will not win -- is refuted by cognitive science. We always exaggerate small probabilities, such as the possibility to win a lottery. Of course, at some point we lose faith in the chance. However, this lack of confidence is not based on a mature consideration of the ticket's chances -- but a result of an exchange of questions, our desperate last attempt to form an answer. Hence the lottery paradox is a purely theoretical problem, parted from reality.

Tables

	Lethal event	T	he actual rat	e	T	he judged rat	e
Tornado		90			688
Venomous bite or sting		48			535
Polio		17			202
Whooping cough		15			171
Smallpox vaccination		8			38
Fireworks		6			331
Measles		5			331
Botulism		2			379
Poisoning by vitamins		1			237
Smallpox		0			88

Table 1: Least probable events.

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Is the Lottery Paradox Psychologically Realistic?

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