Philosophy International Journal (PhIJ)

ISSN: 2641-9130

Review Article

The Explorations of Descartes and Ryle’s Idea of Mind: An Appraisal

Authors: Mishra R*

DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000306

Abstract

This paper attempts to explore the idea of Mind on the basis of René Descartes and Gilbert Ryle’s vision of mind. According to Cartesian dualism, mind, and body are two distinct entities, the mind is a nonphysical entity that consists of consciousness and rational thought, but the body is a physical entity that is subject to physical laws. Concerning the idea of mind, Ryle in his doctrine Category mistake, rejected Cartesian dualism and contended for the mind-body unity. He suggested that mental states and mental processes are not separate from bodily behavior rather they are intricately intertwined with each other. This comparative analysis explores Cartesian dualism including the interaction between mind and body through the pineal gland and his ideas on the mind’s independence from the body. On the other hand, Ryle’s rejection of Cartesian dualism on the basis of Category mistake investigates the notion of mind which prioritizes observable behavior over unobservable mental states. The author explores these two contrasting perspectives of mind and aims to grasp the gigantic skeleton of the historical expansion and implications of the notion of mind in an inclusive manner. The main contention of the author is to highlight the influence of Descartes’s dualistic framework on the basis of philosophical discourse and Ryle’s efforts to challenge it, with the criterion of human cognition and experience considering the relationship between mind, body, and behavior.

Keywords: Mind; Body; Soul; Substance; Cartesian Dualism; Category Mistake

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