The Mind: From Cartesian Dualism to Piccinini’s Computational Functionalism

Authors: Tripathi RL*

DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000333

Volume 7, Issue 3

Abstract

The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience.

Keywords: Mind; Philosophy of Mind; Dualism; Materialism; Functionalism; Mental Phenomena

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