Between the Diabolical and the Banal: Margalit on Humanism and Radical Evil

Authors: Nevo I*

DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000S1-006

Special Issue 1: Practical Uses of Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper, I wish to discuss the Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit’s revival of the notion of “radical evil” in his book On Compromise and Rotten Compromises (2010). Margalit, like Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, sees the historical events of 20th century totalitarianism, specifically, Nazi cruelty and humiliation, as exemplifying an assault on morality itself (by attacking its enabling assumption of a shared humanity). Famously, Arendt withdrew, or complicated, her understanding of Nazi evil in her later notion, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, of the “banality” of evil. Contrary to both Arendt and Margalit, I shall argue that evil is neither radical nor banal. Arendt was right to withdraw the notion of radical evil, and Margalit does not make better sense of it, given the explanatory vacuity of attributing such motives to human agents. Yet, there is nothing banal in the conscious and intentional perpetration of evil, thoughtlessly or otherwise. The myriad ways through which the human pursuit of the good turn into monstrosities are historically, sociologically and psychologically deep and worthy of critical and theoretical reflection. Key words: Radical evil; banality of evil; totalitarianism; Nazism, Stalinism, humanism.

Keywords:

View PDF