ISSN: 2641-9130
Authors: Márquez C*
The main objective of the present paper is to contrast Hutto and Myin’s Radical Enactive, Embodied account of Cognition with some neo-Fregean ideas. By making such contrast my aim is to address the following questions: why and in what sense is it important to recognize that cognition is a normative phenomenon and to attribute contents to minds (even basic minds)? How to develop a non-propositional or non-conceptual account of modes of presentation? I will argue that the Enactivist Approach is compatible with non-conceptual extensions of the Fregean notion of sense. NeoFregeans impose situated and dynamic conditions on the possibility of having knowledge directed to objects, such that although they endorse a normatively guided conception of contentful states, they are not committed with the postulation of modes of presentations as intermediaries between minds and objects. Consequently, they are not committed with theories of mental representations as symbolic items that mediate that relation.
Keywords: Normativity; Radical Enactive; Embodied account of Cognition neo-Fregeanism; Intentionality; Basic Minds
