The Roots of the Concept of Naturalised Epistemology: Russell and Quine

Authors: Jales Ribeiro H

DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000272

Volume 5, Issue 4

Abstract

In this article, contrary to the traditional and still very current interpretations, it is shown how Russell’s philosophy, from the 1920s onwards, was on the path to Quine’s concept of naturalised epistemology, and why Russell, if he had been confronted with such a concept, could not have subscribed to it. With this objective, a re-reading of this philosophy, from the abovementioned era, is proposed, which makes evident his involvement with the problems of naturalism and behaviourism and, especially, with the respective limitations.

Keywords: Analytic philosophy; Epistemology; Holism; Naturalism; Quine; Russell

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