Abstract

The understanding that a person is required or expected to have of themselves must inevitably be linked to their presence in the world as an individual. This sense of self has traditionally remained distant for anthropos, but this existing distance does not eliminate the biological reality or the moral responsibility faced by everyone in the human world. All this is reinforced by the fact that the emergence of humankind, and probably its extinction too, are merely stages in the development of nature, independent of its subjective will or interests. This is why what comes to the fore are not so much the differences between members of the fauna, which are obvious and easily discernible, as the similarities, whose apparent clarity often leads to their underestimation and conceptual neglect.
This article examines an ecosophical problem concerning animal rights - viewed not so much as a legal fiction, but as an ethical duty that binds the human animal to responsibility within its creative actions and the rational morality from which they stem.